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ABSTRACT

The American University in Cairo

CREATED VULNERABILITIES: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
TOURISM DEVELOPMENT IN SHARM El SHEIKH

Catherine Walsh

Sharm El Sheikh represents the typical tourism enclave: removed from the local
culture and environment, homogenous with other destinations in the global south,
and designed to serve the vacationing needs of mass tourism. This form of
tourism development is dated and set to fail, particularly when challenged with
political instability and violence. Literature on mass tourism to the global south
focuses on structural dependency of resorts, but often fail to complicate this
relationship with internal political decision making. This qualitative case study
examines the development of the resort to cater to the desires of the mass tourism
model. The socio-economic dependency of the space on the state and global
tourism dynamics, the exclusion of the local population, and the complicated
security crisis in the peninsula are analyzed as they remain significant challenges
to future recovery of this resort.
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1. INTRODUCTION

The downing of Russian Metrojet flight 9268 caused a fracture in the tourism
sector of Egypt, unprecedented in recent history. The largest attack targeting tourists
within the state, occurred on October 31, 2015, where shortly after the flight departed
Sharm el Sheikh, an explosion brought down the aircraft killing 224 passengers and crew
members. This tragedy caused the immediate and long term halting of international
flights into the resort resulting in industry losses for Egypt, totaling $5.5 billion dollars
from 2015 – 2016. This represents the largest percentage of tourism lost due to political
instability since 1990. While this dramatic loss in tourism can be explained through a
cause and effect relationship of terrorism and tourism decline, there are additional factors
related to the industry’s development, which has laid the foundation for potential long
term crisis within the tourism industry.
The Mubarak regime viewed tourism as a method of resisting outside economic
influence and maintaining regime stability. The regime utilized rapid developments of
tourism spaces in the Sinai as a vehicle for generating revenues, representing a
diversification of the tourism sector when violence threatened its stability. Diversification
of tourism was a necessary step when the industry was destabilized by terrorist violence
and the regime simultaneously faced economic structural changes which threatened its
support throughout Egyptian society. On one hand, the active encouragement of tourism
development, through legal changes and patrimonial based policies, allowed the regime
to strengthen support among the economic elite of the state. This diversification into sun
and sand tourism represented a resistance to looming neoliberal changes, whose swift
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implementation had the potential to negatively affect the working class of the state. The
development of the tourism space in the South Sinai was rapid and uncontrolled, relied
on externally based and controlled demand, expanded beyond actual demand creating
oversupply, and disenfranchised the existing local populations. The short-sighted nature
of this development policy created several vulnerabilities within the economic and
political spheres of the country: over-reliance on externally controlled demand, inability
to remain competitive globally, creation of extreme internal competition, decline in
image of the destination, and overuse of the space leading to ecological degradation.
Development policies pursued by the Mubarak regime in the South Sinai have created a
vulnerability to decline which has been exacerbated by political instability following the
revolution and the terrorist attack of the Metrojet bombing of 2015.
Sharm el Sheikh, and the wider South Sinai, represent an entirely different tourist
space from other historically tourist spaces in Egypt, such as Giza and Luxor. This new
tourism space in the South Sinai has provided large growth in the tourism sector over the
past two decades through the targeting of a specific kind of tourist. The South Sinai
tourist industry embodied 30% of the overall tourism within the country by 2014.1 Mass
based sun/sand tourism is only beginning to return to the country, and has yet to fully
return to the struggling economy of the South Sinai. The exclusive reliance on the
consumption of these spaces by the mass beach tourist created conditions where the loss
of these tourists could significantly impact the tourism sector of the state. While Egypt

1
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sets it sights on building alternate beach based tourist spaces, the South Sinai and Sharm
el Sheikh may never regain the levels of tourism once propping up these resort enclaves.

1.1 Notes on Sharm El Sheikh: A Once Booming Ghost Town

Sharm El Sheikh, a resort city in the South Sinai, was rapidly developed
following instability in the national tourism sector due to terrorism in the mid-1990s. By
2003, the resort had 221 hotels and contained 88% of five star hotels in the South Sinai. 2
This resort was highly important to the national tourism sector, as foreign tourism into
the South Sinai rose from 1 million visitors in 2000 to 3.7 million tourists in 2010.3 In
2010, the tourist arrivals into the South Sinai accounted for 25% of all tourist arrivals into
Egypt and 2.8 million tourists into the South Sinai came from Europe.4 The national
tourism sector has faced significant challenges due to political instability, however the
South Sinai remained a strong contributor to the national sector. The South Sinai
accounted for 2 million European tourists in 2014, 2.78 million tourists overall and
represented 28% of the 9.87 million tourists arrivals into Egypt in 2014.5 The South
Sinai, and the resort of Sharm el Sheikh, became an integral part of the national tourism
sector over these two decades, however the largest terrorist attack against tourists
effectively halted tourism into Sharm for almost 2 years.

2
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The downing of Metrojet flight 9268 in Fall 2015 effectively created a ghost town
out of the formerly booming tourist resort of Sharm el Sheikh. The crippling conditions
within the area created a sense of despair for local businesses and informal workers.
Closed shops and empty streets relay the lack of tourism within the resort. Like a
sardonic joke, billboards plastered with the smiling face of al-Sisi are scattered
throughout Sharm el Sheikh, hailing it as a ‘City of Peace’ in Arabic, Russian and
English. This marketing campaign within the city is wholly detached from the depressing
situation and illuminates the government’s inability to actively engage with the actuality
of the problem. This lack of engagement on the part of the government is mirrored in the
continually dashed hopes of the informal workers, who actively monitor news regarding
resuming direct flights into the city. This distinct feeling of loss, observations of closed
businesses and informal interviews with workers who have persevered through this
devastation have implanted the budding ideas for this project.
As a tourist to the city, there is a palpable desperation for business which
indicates the struggling nature of the local tourism industry. Following the downing of
Metrojet flight 9268, the two main countries of origin for tourism to Sharm el Sheikh
immediately ceased direct flights into the city due to security concerns. The UK and
Russia provided 4 million tourists to Egypt in 2014, about 40% of all tourist arrivals. This
long term loss is apparent within the resort. When visiting beaches, cafes and restaurants
during several trips to Sharm el Sheikh over 2016, I was often the only customer. This
distinct lack of patrons contrasts sharply to the formerly year round hotel occupancy rates
of 70%.6 Naama Bay, once the downtown for local nightlife, was characterized by

6
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bouncers and café employees waiting for customers who never come. These
establishments often closed without selling a single drink. In discussing these depressing
circumstances, locals often mentioned that they were waiting for flights into the city to
resume, for the return of British and Russian tourists. Russian tourism being especially
important, workers often stated that it was nearly impossible to make a living in the city
without learning Russian. Driving through the city, there were more abandoned small
hotels than those still open and the once thriving open air mall of Mercato seemed vacant
because of the numerous empty store fronts. The ‘Old City’, a manufactured space dating
to the mid-1990s, was fashioned after historic markets in other cities. This market,
created for tourism, featured vendors nervously smoking, while they carefully watched
the few tourists walking through the area.
This study flows from my informal discussions of the hardships faced by informal
workers in the resort to the regional and national levels through an exploration of how the
halting of direct flights from Russia and the UK, an unprecedented action, crippled the
local economy. As a tourist, the human impact left a lasting impression, while as an
academic, it was natural to think about why this attack devastated the local economy. The
development and maintenance of the space as a tourist enclave is undeniable when the
space is compared to other locations within Egypt. Other resorts along the Red Sea and
the South Sinai cater to domestic tourism, like El Gouna and Dahab, or are functioning
cities, like Hurghada, which rely on a mix of foreign and domestic tourism from all class
levels.
El Gouna, another manufactured tourist space on the Red Sea coast, was carefully
planned and built with the targeting of domestic elites in mind through the building of
9

luxury villas and flats sold to national and international clientele. Hotels, the marina and
surrounding areas of the city were zoned to support summer homes and tourism facilities
together, preventing an oversupply of hotels. Hurghada, which offers facilities with
multi-tiered price points suitable for international guests and domestic middle class
tourism, has gone beyond the resort enclave model to become a more complete city with
resident locals. This model contrasts with Sharm el Sheikh, which forced out the locals
and destroyed the original village. Other South Sinai locations, like Dahab, Nuweiba and
Ras Mohamed, are famous for the natural coral reefs and cater to domestic and foreign
tourism for different class levels: specifically there are budget accommodations attracting
backpacking tourists from Egypt, Israel and other foreign countries.
Sharm el Sheikh is unique in conceptualized development seeking the mass
tourism beach market from the European middle class. The perpetuation of the space for
this specific tourist consumption has inevitably created the conditions for this long term
crisis in the tourism industry. In focusing efforts of development for the middle class of
more wealthy countries, the space became oversupplied in luxury hotels without control
over demand for these facilities. When the space lost the ability to compete against other
destinations, through the shock of the terrorist attack, the over reliance on mass beach
tourism contributed to the crisis of tourism faced by Sharm el Sheikh.

10

1.2 Problems with Stunted Tourism Development: Mass Tourism, Power and the
Tourism Enclave

1.2.1 Theory, Power and Tourism Development
The research questions driving this endeavor focus on the role of power in the
development of the tourism industry. Structural power in development broadly describes
tensions between the international economic system, the state and society. 7 This power
dynamic, the international on the state economy, has led scholars of tourism to use
development theories in their attempt to ascertain economic benefits of tourism, utilizing
modernization through macroeconomic analysis, then critiquing this application with
dependency based arguments complicating the relationship of development and domestic
tourism industries. This section outlines the development based approaches to the study
of tourism, especially in regard to power dynamics in the resort enclave model. While
development theorists once argued that tourism modernized economies and provided an
avenue for development , critics of this idea argued that tourism often created an unequal
relationship between the global north and south, especially in the case of resort enclaves.
The process of globalization creates an increasingly interconnected world through
shortened distances, instant communication and spread of information. Globalization
expressed through tourism has expanded and deepened the dependency of the local on the
worldwide economy.8 The globalization process increases worldwide tourism by making
distances smaller and creating more interconnected markets, as well as allowing the

Farah, Nadia. “Introduction”. Egypt’s Political Economy: Power Relations in Development. American
University in Cairo Press. (1990).
8
Edelman, Marc, and Angelique Haugerud. The Anthropology of Development and Globalization: from
Classical Political Economy to Contemporary Neoliberalism. Blackwell, (2010).pp 3
7
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tourist access to travel large distances.9 Globalization influences local tourism culture
through the creation of homogenous, inauthentic spaces for consumption by the mass
tourist.10 The economic benefits of mass tourism to the state encourage the state to
develop their tourism industries to cater to this demand. Political globalization impacts
the sovereignty of nation states through an erosion process which heavily encourages
compliance to a worldwide standard of creating and operating these tourism markets
domestically.11 Globalization in economics, politics and culture is inevitable as the world
shrinks, the local must necessarily make contact with the global, but differing
development theories emerged to help explain the power dynamics and the benefits of
this process.
Modernization theory was the earliest attempt at a theoretical understanding of the
process of development. Modernization theory begins with the assumption that cultures
and societies follow a linear progression and the connection between cultures will bring
about faster development in the more traditional societies. ‘Traditional’ societies will
inevitably become like the ‘modern’ societies of the West. Starting from an economic
perspective, modernization theory expanded to a perspective which includes politics,
anthropology, and psychology.12 Thus the transition from the traditional to the modern,
for modernization theorists, included a shift from the rural to the urban, less emphasis on
family ties, and a move towards modern values and institutions.13 The evolutionary move

9

Allen, John, and Doreen Barbara Massey. Geographical Worlds. Oxford University Press, 1995.
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Routledge, 1998. p 12.
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Tefler, David. “The Evolution of Tourism and Development Theory.” Tourism and Development:
Concepts and Issues, edited by Richard Sharpley and David Tefler, Channel View Publications, 2015., p 40
13
Ibid
10

12

from traditional to modern within a country can be helped by the tourism sector within
the domestic economy. From a modernization perspective tourism could be a
development strategy which can ‘transfer new technology, increase employment,
generate foreign exchange, increase GDP and attract development capital’.14 The tourism
industry was theorized as an economic alternative for states which had not developed
industrialization, with the mass tourism model being especially helpful in stimulating
development.15 The mass tourism model could easily help develop states with naturally
beautiful settings, appealing climates and a surplus of cheap labor.16 ####Modernization
based approaches to development underpinned integration into the international economy
through supranational institutions. Tourism was theorized as a method for development
of global south states who lacked industrialization. Globalization, and the integration of
the global south into the worldwide economy, was manifested through international
institutions which granted loans to newly independent states to aid in the development of
their tourism sectors for mass tourism.17
Within states, modernization approaches to development inspired tourism
industry growth as a means to create a modern state in the absence of democratization;
this ideology was adopted in Egypt, Greece, the Philippines, Spain and Tunisia.18 For
cultural development, tourism promotes a modern way of life with western values, and it

Tefler, David. “The Evolution of Tourism and Development Theory.” Tourism and Development:
Concepts and Issues, edited by Richard Sharpley and David Tefler, Channel View Publications, 2015.p 52
15
Bond, M. and Ladman, J. “International Tourism an instrument for Third World Development”
Dialectics of Third World Development. 1980.
16
Bianchi, R. “Towards a new political economy of global tourism” Tourism and Development: Concepts
and Issues. edited by Richard Sharpley and David Tefler, Channel View Publications, 2015. p 90
17
Dekadt, E. Tourism: Passport to Development? Perspectives on the Social and Cultural Effects of
Tourism in Developing Countries. Oxford University Press. 1979
18
Bianchi, R. “The Political Economy of Tourism Development: A Critical Review” Annals of Tourism
Research. 70 (2018) 88-102.
14
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can generate rural transformations of traditional societies.19 Not only would tourism
promote a healthier and faster growing domestic economy, the tourist areas would give
locals employment and access to understanding the world through interaction with new
populations. For early studies focused on macro-level development indicators impacted
by tourism, modernization helped categorize the move between the poles of traditional
and modern within a destination country and seemingly stimulated growth in economies
lacking industrialization.
Critics of modernization theory insisted that its linear progression model based on
western experience was unable to be replicated in the global south. Dependency theorists
view the macro-economic benefits of mass tourism as inconsequential, as the state will
never fully develop and integrate internationally through tourism because the tourist
space is necessarily subjugated to the needs, desires, and whims of the west.
Modernization theory has been condemned as being a justification for continued
exploitation of the developing world by western economies.20 Western domination, for
dependency theorists, is perpetuated because of external and internal political, economic
and institutional structures within developing countries which keep them in a dependent
status.21 Theorists within this varied discourse move Marxist critiques of western oriented
capitalist economics to a more nuanced examination of the characteristics of persistent
underdevelopment in the global south.22

Tefler, David. “The Evolution of Tourism and Development Theory.” Tourism and Development:
Concepts and Issues, edited by Richard Sharpley and David Tefler, Channel View Publications, 2015.
quoting the work of Matheison & Wall, 1982; Harrison, 1992; Pi-Sunyer, 1989
20
Tefler, David. “The Evolution of Tourism and Development Theory.” Tourism and Development:
Concepts and Issues, edited by Richard Sharpley and David Tefler, Channel View Publications, 2015. p 41
21
Todaro, Michael P. Economic Development. Pearson Education, 2003.
22
Tefler, David. “The Evolution of Tourism and Development Theory.” Tourism and Development:
Concepts and Issues, edited by Richard Sharpley and David Tefler, Channel View Publications, 2015, p 42
19
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The core-periphery model of the world, within dependency literature, asserts an
unequal relationship between the developed and the developing world. The core
represents the economic center, where demand and supply originate, which perpetually
increases power while causing the global south increased dependence on the centralized
world economy. The core exploits the periphery’s resources in its pursuit of more
economic power. Supply is taken through exploitation of the periphery, which is never
able to share in the benefits of the goods and services. Tourism within the periphery has
been compared to a plantation economy: the needs of the center are met by developing
countries who are never able to keep the generated wealth.23 The process of globalization
in tourism, between powerful and dependent states, necessarily creates uneven and
unequal development within the global south. The first world receives the most income
from tourism, are the most often visited and essentially create the demand for tourism.24
Through the mass tourism model, global south destinations become controlled through
comprehensive marketing systems and standardized packages created in the core.25 When
a country is deemed unsafe for travel, global north countries circulate this notion and can
virtually destroy the tourism industry within the country. Global South countries rely on
the patronage of the global north, as they have very little other choice in alternative
tourism markets.26 This unequal power dynamic stems from global north countries
providing the majority of the worldwide demand for leisure tourism. In this way, these

Tefler, David. “The Evolution of Tourism and Development Theory.” Tourism and Development:
Concepts and Issues, edited by Richard Sharpley and David Tefler, Channel View Publications, 2015. p 54
24
Mowforth, Martin, and Ian Munt. Tourism and Sustainability: New Tourism in the Third World.
Routledge, 1998. P 17
25
Britton, Stephen G. “The Political Economy of Tourism in the Third World.” Annals of Tourism
Research, 9.3 (1982) pp. 331–358.
26
Mowforth, Martin, and Ian Munt. Tourism and Sustainability: New Tourism in the Third World.
Routledge, 1998. P 16-17
23
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countries hold both the political and economic power in relation to global south
destinations.
The unequal power relationship in politics and economic structural conditions
between the global north and south led some scholars examining tourism in the global
south to reject the view that tourism aids in developing host countries.27Case studies
focused on small island economies heavily dependent on tourism cite specific examples
of unequal economic and social impacts of global north tourism on global south states.28
These studies set the stage for theorists to begin to connect tourism and perpetual
underdevelopment. Britton’s research on Fiji applies the concepts of dependency to this
case study and critiques the notion of tourism creating development.29 While tourism is
believed to be a strategy to generate foreign exchange, increase domestic employment,
attract outside development capital, and create economic independence for a global south
state, this is a flawed analysis of the benefits of tourism for the state. The structure of the
international industry of tourism creates a relationship where the global south state
remains in a development mode due to commercial power remaining in the hands of
foreign enterprises.30 Britton demonstrates his conclusions through a three tiered model
of global south tourism: headquarters, branch offices, and small-scale tourist enterprises.

Turner, Louis. “The International Division of Leisure: Tourism and the Third World.” World
Development, 4.3 (1976) pp. 253–260.
28
Bryden, John M. Tourism and Development: a Case Study of the Commonwealth Caribbean. Cambridge
University Press, 1973.
--- Hills, Theo L., and Jan Lundgren. “The Impact of Tourism in the Caribbean.” Annals of Tourism
Research, 4.5 (1977) pp. 248–267.
--- Perez, L. “Aspects of Underdevelopment in the West Indies.” Science and Society 37 (1974) pp. 473–
80.
29
Britton, Stephen G. “The Political Economy of Tourism in the Third World.” Annals of Tourism
Research, vol. 9, no. 3, 1982, pp. 331–358.
30
Ibid; Britton, S. “The Spatial Organization of Tourism in a Neo-Colonial Economy: A Fiji Case Study”
Pacific Viewpoint 21 (1981) 144-65.
27
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Global south tourism destinations become controlled by comprehensive marketing
systems and standardized packages created in the core. This dynamic reinforces the
states dependency on the core and creates a vulnerability towards the developed
countries. Commercial gains from domestic tourism go to foreign enterprises and
contribute to the continued underdeveloped nature of the peripheral state.31
The dependency perspective on tourism development is furthered through a
structural example which perpetuates dependence through the expression of economic
ideals through political institutions. For dependency purists, the structure of the
international system promotes dependence through forced liberalization by supranational
institutions and the manifestation of these openings in the tourism sector. The European
Union, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade
Organization are among the international community of supranational institutions which
have the power to directly impact the economies and political decisions of countries in
the global south. One major example are the structural adjustment programs enforced by
the IMF and the World Bank after dispensing a loan to a global south country. This
necessarily changes the economic structure of the state through neoliberal economic
principles demanding de-nationalization, privatization, and reduction in state services.32
These changes are externally mandated through the necessity of paying back the loans,
but make the living conditions within the state harsher for the population.33 Structural
Adjustment, the means of influence of the international over domestic economies,

Britton, Stephen G. “The Political Economy of Tourism in the Third World.” Annals of Tourism
Research, vol. 9, no. 3, 1982, pp. 331–358.
32
Mowforth, Martin, and Ian Munt. Tourism and Sustainability: New Tourism in the Third World.
Routledge, 1998. P 32- 35
33
Ibid, 291
31
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demanded the liberalization of these economies furthering the economic power of the
transnational and domestic elite.34 Gaining power often occurs due to increased power of
transnational corporations within the state, with the tourism industry being a prime
example of this process due to enforced liberalization and privatization.35 This hegemonic
relationship is often cemented through the active promotion of tourism as a means of
development, the necessity of building infrastructure to facilitate tourism, receiving
another loan to pay for this infrastructure, and the application of another round of
structural adjustments to national fiscal policy to repay this loan.36 This cyclical dynamic
exemplifies international coercion which perpetuates dependency of the state through the
promise of development.
Structural adjustments affected the political decision making in tourism
development within Egypt. Contrary to the straightforward relationship between forced
liberalization and heavily increased foreign domination in the tourism sector, Egypt
maintained control under the liberalization of the economy partially through the revenues
generated from the tourism. Under pressure to meet structural adjustments required by
loans from the IMF in the 1990s, the Mubarak regime resisted quick, sweeping change
due to the generation of extra revenues from the tourism sector to maintain balance of
payments and fill in the gaps within the national budget.37 This strategy allowed the

Dieke, Peter. “Tourism and Structural Adjustment Programmes in the African Economy.” Tourism
Economics, 1.1 (1995) pp. 71–93.
35
Mowforth, Martin, and Ian Munt. Tourism and Sustainability: New Tourism in the Third World.
Routledge, 1998. p 291
36
Mowforth, Martin, and Ian Munt. Tourism and Sustainability: New Tourism in the Third World.
Routledge, 1998
37
Richter, Thomas and Christian Steiner. “Politics, Economics and Tourism Development in Egypt:
Sectoral Transformations of a Neo-patrimonial rentier state” Third World Quarterly 29.5 (2008): 939 –
959.
34
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regime to make changes along its own schedule. Enjoying the benefits from the industry,
the regime sought to increase revenues through diversifying sources for tourism.38
Conceptualization of resort development on the Red Sea and Sinai emanated from the
desire to increase revenues, with mass package tourism identified as the most profitable
market to target. Privatization of tourist facilities was required by the IMF, but had been
planned a decade prior, as the regime recognized that the industry would experience
growth and higher efficiency under the private sector. While conceptualizing the future
resorts of the South Sinai, Egypt concurrently implemented planned privatization of the
industry.

1.2.2 Mass Tourism and the Dependent Resort Enclave
The rejection of modernization as applicable in the global south and the critiques
of neoliberalism as perpetuating dependency allow for a more nuanced understanding of
the inequality in power between the developing state and globalizing forces, one which
perpetuates chronic underdevelopment. The examination of power relationships between
the global north and global south have extended to the application of concepts of
colonialist and imperialist forms of domination to the area of tourism. Early theoretical
models of the developed world vacationing in the developing world describe the
‘pleasure periphery’, sun and sea locations short flights away from the industrialized
core, built to serve the needs of the new emerging middle class.39 Tourism turns global

Ibid; Brown, Frances and Derek Hall “Tourism and Development in the Global South: The Issues” Third
World Quarterly 29.5 (2008) 839-849.
39
Turner, Louis, and John Ash. The Golden Hordes: International Tourism and the Pleasure Periphery. St.
Martin's Press, 1976.
38
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south cultures into commodities and these spaces become a ‘hedonistic playground’ for
the comparatively wealthy foreigner.40 Tourism as imperialism arguments insist that
power remains in the core: the core creates the tourist demand and the tourists
themselves.41 Tourism is an expression of colonialism in the sense that it promotes the
dynamic of domination/subjugation42 and recreates the master-slave relationship between
the tourist and the host society.43
Cultural dependency, as theorized through these writings on imperialism and
colonialism, is epitomized by the mass tourism model. This form of tourism creates a
homogenized package for the tourist desiring a specific kind of holiday. Mass tourism
represents an older style of tourism characterized by Fordism (economic and social
systems based on mass production and mass consumption), packaged, standardized, and
irresponsible. Globalization influences local tourism culture through the creation of
homogenous, inauthentic spaces for consumption by the mass tourist.44 Internal political
processes are impacted through an erosion of sovereignty and the necessary compliance
with worldwide standards of operating these spaces.45 This form of tourism seeks the
sand, sea, sun and usually sex with a disregard for what is culturally, socially and
environmentally responsible.46
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Resort development in the Middle East during the 1970s was characterized by
mass production to meet the mass consumption of the era.47 Twenty years later, the
development of Sharm el Sheikh followed the models of other resort development which
occurred on the Mediterranean Coast in North Africa. Diverging from the traditional
dependency relationship espoused by theorists examining global south resorts, domestic
business elite invested in tourism facilities within Sharm el Sheikh and retain ownership
due to legal regulations in the Sinai. This heavy investment was encouraged by
government policies designed for rapid development. The government and domestic
elites exercised agency in the building of these resorts along the projected future demand
of European clientele. Despite this major difference in the models of dependency in other
states tourism sectors, the mass tourism model and the inherent dependency on the needs
and desires of the western tourist characterize the tourism space of Sharm el Sheikh.
Sharm el Sheikh embodies the resort enclave meant to serve the needs of mass
tourism. The remote city is contained by natural borders of the sea and a mountain range
with checkpoint controlled entry along the two roads into the space. The shoreline was
bought early by domestic businessmen, zoned for tourism and developed as closed
beached for numerous luxury hotels, with local workers needing to travel outside the city
to visit public beaches. The entirety of the Naama Bay shoreline is contained as private
beaches for hotels, and a manufactured city center was developed behind the hotels, with
clubs, restaurants and open air cafes. Three additional manufactured spaces were created
for shopping, the ‘Old City’ designed to emulate historic markets, Soho Square and
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Mercato were private developments attached to hotels offering several shopping and
dining options. Private residences are few and lack beach access, with Delta Sharm being
predominately rented to individual tourists. The city proper contains only residents who
work within the tourism industry, as the original local population was moved out of the
area and Bedouins are restricted from entering the city. Within the enclave, tourists
arrive to the destination and are transported directly to the closed off area created for
them.48 Separate from the host community and not meant to benefit the local
community.49 The foreign tourist is unlikely to move outside of the walls of the enclave
area. Segregation between the tourist and the local population occurs, which represents a
form of neo-colonialization.50 The city was conceptualized for the mass beach tourist, and
relied heavily upon tours organized from European markets. Although the resort’s
ownership largely remains with domestic businessmen, a unique feature against other
resort enclaves, the space was built to serve the desires of mass beach tourism.
Resort enclave development occurs to meet a demand and experiences an
eventual decline due to the inability to continue to meet that need.51 This process of
development, stagnation and decline was conceptualized by Richard Butler in 1980 as the
‘resort cycle’, modeled after the classic writings within business on life cycles of a
product.52 Several characteristics of Sharm el Sheikh before the bombing of Metrojet
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flight 9268 coincide with the stagnation phase of Butler’s model: large spaces were
specifically built to cater towards tourism activities, these facilities were characterized by
inauthenticity, a decline in image from fashionable to outdated occurred, the resort
heavily relied on repeat visitation coming from mass based tourism, and Bedouin locals
were excluded from the development process.53 Oversupply ensued, surpassing demand
and local capacity. With exceeded capacity, the quality of experience degrades causing
decline in visitation, lending less resources to maintenance of the resort.54 The resort
cycle has highly influenced the understanding of the process of resort development and
decline, and has been applied in many differing contexts.55 Within the context of Sharm
el Sheikh, this modeling demonstrates the extent to which the space is dependent on
tourism stemming from the mass beach tourism market, with inevitable decline without
diversification away from this reliance.56 Sharm el Sheikh met several required features
for the consolidation and stagnation phases according to Butler, warning potential decline
without intervention.
The mass tourism model, and the resort enclave it creates in the global south,
represents an outdated modern form of tourism. A shift is occurring between this modern
form to a postmodern model of tourism which is individualized, post-fordist, flexible
(unpackaged), real and more responsible to the local community.57 This shift allows for
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tourism to be less of a commoditizing force to a destination, as the homogenous resort is
replaced by a tourist space which is not divorced from the local community and
environment. The mass tourist, in new tourism, is exchanged with the individual seeking
understanding of local cultures and authenticity of experience.58 This shift is not relevant
to the current state of the resort of Sharm el Sheikh, which epitomizes the mass tourist
model of the resort enclave and is unlikely to develop into a space catering to new forms
of authentic, sustainable tourism.

1.2.3 Contextualizing the Tourism Sector in Egypt
Integral to the structure of the Egyptian economy, tourism represents a means of
gaining foreign currency, maintaining balance of payments in trade, and providing
employment for 2.1 million Egyptians in 2014 (over 8% of total employment
nationally).59 The Mubarak regime recognized the benefits of the tourism industry and
sought to encourage growth within the sector while pursuing measured privatization
required by the International Monetary Fund. While neoliberalism based economics
backed the changes pushed by the international community, Mubarak scheduled
privatization of state owned industry, including publicly held hotels, tourism companies
and the state airline, in a three stage approach. While this process of privatization had
little effects on the South Sinai, as it had barely begun its development journey at this
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time, it laid the foundations for the government’s approach toward development in the
territory.
There are divergent opinions on the government’s role in development in the
tourism sector. Matthew Gray and the work of Thomas Richter and Christian Steiner
complicate the traditional understanding of neoliberalism in Egypt through their insertion
of national politics into the changes made during the structural adjustment reforms. For
Gray, the dual processes of privatization and liberalization are evident within Egypt’s
tourism sector, and were largely successful until the late 1990s when his study was
published. Privatization pushed profitable enterprises out of the hands of the public
sector, which resulted in negligible financial benefits for the state.60 Liberalization within
the tourism industry pursued by the Mubarak government sought rapid expansion with
the perception that this development would provide much more benefits than harms for
the state.
Gray assessed that that the tourism sector in Egypt, once a sector with exponential
growth, illuminates the dangers of widespread privatization with little strategic planning
on the part of the government. Grays’ study, published in 1998, warns of a possible
collapse in the tourist sector through unrestrained growth, lack of strategy, and loss of
control by the government. Gray warns of the dangers of the ‘Tourist Cycle’: ‘where a
destination becomes destroyed or damaged by tourism to such an extent that tourists no
longer want to visit it’.61 This process occurs due to a lack of planning creating damage to
the environment, dissatisfaction from locals, rapid social and economic change, an
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inequity in economic distribution, and an over-supply in the sector leading to
unemployment and loss in investments.62 This work illuminates a burgeoning problem
within the tourist sector due to unplanned and unrestrained growth.
Gray’s observations, following his chronological study of privatization and
liberalization within Egypt’s national tourism industry, are updated by this present study.
His warning of the dangers of collapse due to lack of planning and oversupply within the
industry did not come into fruition nationally, but when evaluating the current crisis of
Sharm el Sheikh, the dangers of the tourist cycle are evident. Sharm el Sheikh developed
in a wholly different way, is reliant upon one form of tourism, and the building of
facilities had a trajectory unmatched in the development of facilities in other cities. While
the target market for the space was conceptualized by the government, it was left to the
private sector to carve out tourism facilities without central planning or control.
Richter and Steiner’s work characterize the Egyptian state as a neo-patrimonial
rentier state, which actively chose development strategies in the midst of neoliberal
economic reforms. Opposing traditional understandings of neoliberalism in its ability to
reduce reliance on rentier style economics, Egypt offers an example of a maintenance of
rentier economics stemming from the privatization of the tourism industry. Liberalization
in Egypt occurred alongside the encouragement of development and investment in
tourism capabilities leading to a continuation of rentier economics.63 This important
observation on tourism development lends itself to the overarching understanding of the
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mentality of the government: in place of encouraging development in multiple domestic
industries, the tourism sector was emphasized as a means of gaining foreign exchange
earnings and overcoming balance of payment issues which originally ushered in the need
for neoliberal economic reforms. This emphasis on rapid development is demonstrated by
the selling of publically owned land in the South Sinai to the domestic elite and the
encouragement of quickly creating tourism capacities in the space.
Tourism policies of the Mubarak regime centered upon maximizing Egypt’s
abilities to attract visitors and investments, ensuring the continued reliance on the sector
for economic stability. Privatization and liberalization of tourism in Egypt occurred
alongside the fledgling conceptualization of the tourism space of the South Sinai. While
neoliberalism influenced the changes made by the regime, it is important to insert
domestic politics and the choices made internally. The government slowly privatized the
industry, chose to diversify tourism through development of beach resorts, and
strategically encouraged private investment in tourism as a way to stabilize the national
economy and resist rapid neoliberal change.

1.2.4 Complicating the Connection: Tourism after Terrorism
Tourism in Egypt has produced substantial economic benefits to the state, but has
been subject to fluctuations due to the threat of political violence. The impact of political
violence on tourism has been heavily studied, both in the Egyptian context and in other
international cases to conclude that political violence and terrorist attacks have a
significant ability to harm tourism within a state. Tourism in Egypt has historically
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recovered from political violence quicker than other destinations in the Middle East.64
The case of the downing of Metrojet flight 9268 stands as an outlier to this trend.
Studies exploring the connection between tourism and terrorism within the recent
history of Egypt demonstrate an inverse relationship between terrorist attacks and tourism
while complicating this relationship. In looking at the interconnected nature of economics
and politics in Egypt in the mid-1990s, Cassandra emphasizes the danger of political
violence specifically for employment and income distribution due to the increasing
reliance on tourism as a means of generating revenues within the state.65 This concern for
internal dynamics was important during the time of writing, but the tourism industry
experienced growth following these fluctuations. The current case examined within this
work can relate to those early fears due to the significant loss of business experienced,
especially in the South Sinai.
Potential tourists engage in destination substitution when faced with unstable
conditions in a possible holiday destination. Other locations are visited in response to
violent attacks on tourists (but not to local tensions) and European guests are extremely
sensitive to Egyptian government crackdown on Islamist opposition, which has a further
impact on these tourist’s decision making.66 This surprising assertion indicates that both
terrorist violence and government response combine to prolong the loss in tourism
experienced by the state. In the case of Sharm el Sheikh, this indicates that the
government must be extremely careful, while it historically pursued strong tactics to
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decrease terrorist violence, it must acknowledge tourist perceptions of these strategies.
This research also partially explains, along with the attack itself, why the loss in tourism
has lasted this long. Not only was this one of the largest attacks against tourists,
encouraging them to choose other destinations in the future, but the violent response by
the government also turned European tourists away.
Adding to this assertion, that violent government reaction affects tourism arrivals
alongside terrorist attacks, a quantitative study conducted by Neumayer demonstrates that
the political system itself affects tourism. Autocracies in general receive less foreign
tourists against their more democratic competitors, even without widespread crackdowns
and politically motivated violence. The addition of human rights violations and active
conflict further compounds the loss in tourism experienced by the state. Substantial
increases in political violence lower tourist arrivals by one fourth globally, while if the
country manages to end politically motivated violence and changes their perception
within the international media, then tourism can regain previous momentum.67 These
works demonstrate that government actions also affect tourism indicators, complicating
the notion that terrorism alone negatively impact tourism.
Long term political instability can have more significant effects on a country’s
tourism industry than single incident terrorist attacks. Furthermore, countries that
experience high levels of political risk endure significant reductions in tourism.68 The
political environment within Egypt can be considered a high risk political atmosphere
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within the parameters of this study due to political repression, continual terrorism
incidents and violent political change within the last five years. This atmosphere of
political instability, coupled with the terrorist attack in Sharm el Sheikh, should have
produced a decline in the tourist sector nationally and within the city itself.
The resort enclave model presents several challenges when coupled with long
term political instability and violence. This is due to the high possibility for tourists to
engage in destination substitution due to the highly substitutable features of resorts.
Before diversification of tourism in Egypt, the destination held competitive advantages
against other destinations due to its unique features. If the destination holds unique
characteristics (such as Egyptian pharaonic history), then tourists are unlikely to
substitute this destination for another despite political violence. However, if a
destination’s characteristics are able to be substituted easily (such as sunny, warm
beaches and nice nightlife) then it is particularly vulnerable to substitution by tourists if
they are faced with political violence and risk.69 Tourists choose alternate destinations
when political conditions appear to be unstable.70 Additionally following terrorist attacks,
tourists prefer to spend 25% less on vacations to the destination.71 Following these
conditions, Egypt’s characteristics are not easily substituted, so tourism as a whole should
recover following political violence. However, when discussing a tourist enclave such as
Sharm el Sheikh, where visitors fly in to enjoy a beach holiday without excursions into
Cairo or Luxor, political violence should have a different effect. These features of the
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resort enclave are easily substituted with safer destinations where European tourists can
enjoy the beach without fear of terrorism or other forms of political violence. Crisis
management for resort enclaves is critical following the destabilizing forces of political
violence and instability.
Crisis management following political violence in tourism destinations presents
an alternate place where states lack control. Domestic tourism is affected by the spillover
effect, especially with western tourism in the Middle East. This effect shows decline in
western tourism in the region with incidents of political violence, which is attributed to
the conflated idea of risk in the region.72 The perception of instability within a
destination, can persuade tourists to choose other destinations, while foreign governments
and media can perpetuate the idea of danger in a global south destination.73 External
negative images of the liberation struggles and subsequent coups in African states
severely damaged their burgeoning tourism sectors.74 The media coverage of crisis and
violence in destinations have been shown to be sensationalized and highly negative,
while the viewers interpretation of events is more incoherent with further distance to the
destination country.75 The issuing of security advisories against travel to certain countries
allows the first world to determine where tourists should travel. These advisories are
highly political in nature, dependent upon the relationships between states: states with
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better relations with a first world country have a higher threshold of danger to tourists to
warrant formal warnings.76
These studies problematize what would otherwise be a straightforward
relationship between terrorism and decline in tourism. Government reaction and
government type, along with human rights violations and political violence, work
alongside single acts of terror to dissuade vacation goers from choosing a destination,
with European tourists being especially sensitive to violence perpetrated by the
government. If the country is experiencing heightened political risk through consecutive
acts of violence, the loss of tourism is prolonged. Destinations which do not have unique
features, are particularly vulnerable following political violence because vacationers are
highly likely to engage in destination substitution.

1.3 Research Questions

This project seeks to explore the creation of the tourism space of the Sharm El
Sheikh: the purpose of the space, the policies implemented to stimulate tourism in the
area, and the contribution of this development to future instability of the tourism sector in
the area. This project broadly views government development policies as the independent
variable and the vulnerability to crisis within the tourism sector as the dependent variable.
To explore the relationship between these variables, four research questions have been
developed. The research questions driving this inquiry focus on the relationship of
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government policy and development and seek to understand the vulnerabilities which
emerged from the dual forces of development policy and political instability.

Research Question A. Why did the Mubarak Regime and economic elites
seek to develop tourism in the South Sinai? What were the economic benefits of the
design and rapid development of this tourism space?
Hypothesis A. Tourism development in the South Sinai provided the state with
macroeconomic benefits, at a time when mainland tourism faced instability due to
terrorism. This development was an opportunity to entrench the regime through
patronage, job creation and economic stability. Tourism Revenues have proven to be an
extremely important source of foreign currency for the state, providing stability in hard
currency necessary to maintain a positive balance of payments. This extra revenue
provided the state with leeway within national budgets, allowing the Mubarak regime to
choose the timing of the implementation of harsh economic reforms required by the IMF
during the 1990s. The regime resisted outside pressure for fiscal change, despite the
fluctuations in tourism revenues throughout the decade due to terrorist violence. The
policies of diversification of tourism into the sun/sand resorts of the Sinai was an
effective strategy to gain stability in tourism revenues through a space removed from
terrorist activity. The regime encouraged rapid development of these new tourism spaces
to regain stability in tourism revenues, thus maintaining the overall political stability of
the regime itself.
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Research Question B. How did the planned target market for tourism create
an initial vulnerability to changing external demand?
Hypothesis B. The early planning for the resort spaces of the South Sinai
deliberately target the European mass tourism market. This market was targeted due to
the perceived growth of demand, the relative wealth and proximity, and the perceived
stability in this form of tourism. However, this targeting ultimately led to several
problems in the later development of the South Sinai according to the stages of the
Tourism Area Life Cycle modeled by the work of Richard Butler.77 This highly
influential model of resort development outlines the linear stages of growth and decline
of a tourism space, with several criteria for each of the models five stages. Sharm El
Sheikh developed in line with this model and exemplified the stagnation point, the stage
before decline. Supply outgrew demand, internal and external competition drove down
prices which led to a lower level of tourist frequenting the resort. Overuse and poor
planning has begun to cause ecological damage and the design of the tourism spaces have
led to a resort model which is divorced from the local environment. The degradation of
the space and the level of tourist, coupled with current political instability has threatened
this territory’s ability to remain globally competitive.
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Research Question C. What is the relationship between the created tourism
space and local populations?
The South Sinai is populated with Bedouin whose livelihoods required full range
of the environment along with access to the coast for fishing. These small communities
were pushed away from the coast through the demarcation of these spaces for tourism
and the eventual building of the resorts. These populations were excluded from the
planning process and the ability to gain revenues through the sale of the land to elites and
the control of the territory by security forces (especially in the case of Sharm El Sheikh).
They are systematically excluded from tourism related activities and are not employed
formally in the tourism sector. This exclusion of local populations has created distrust
and deepened social isolation between the Sinai and mainland Egypt.

Research Question D. Has recent political instability changed tourism
dynamics in the South Sinai?
Hypothesis D. Terrorist actions have impacted tourism arrivals and revenues
through the 1990s and early 2000s in Egypt. Tourism to Egypt has also been subjected to
instability through the spillover effect: instability in neighboring countries leading to
drops in tourism domestically; as well as negative image transfer following the long-term
instability created by the 2011 uprising. Following the regime change, central control
over the Sinai deteriorated, creating a space for the entrenchment of terrorist elements
within the territory. The heavy handed security policy of the state, in the attempt to both
regain control and punish terrorists responsible for the downing of Metrojet flight 9268,
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has created a protracted conflict in the North and has perpetrated the negative image of
instability of the Sinai peninsula. Further impacting the recovery of tourism, external
governments and travel agents remain in almost total control of image repair in the
placement of travel warnings (from governments) and decreased bookings (agents).

These four research questions seek to understand the active creation and
development of the tourism industry of the South Sinai in terms of benefits to the
government and the economic elites within the country. Question A focuses on the
conceptualization of the tourism space and locates this vision in the context of the
political climate in Egypt in the 1990s. This question attempts to ascertain how the
regime used tourism development to resist neoliberal economic changes, which were
viewed as a potential destabilizing force within society during the period. This question
also seeks to map the policies implemented by the regime which encouraged rapid
development through the investments of private elites in multiple ways. Question B
forwards the overarching hypothesis of this work through the specific analysis of the
targeted market of the mass beach tourism for this envisioned tourism space in the South
Sinai. The current vulnerability witnessed in the tourism industry is found in the specific
targeting of the European mass based tourism market, due to a lack of control over
demand for Sharm El Sheikh as a destination. This lack control in demand stems from
economic conditions, the inability to compete with other similar destinations, and
political conditions, the lack of power to change the perception of risk to tourists in the
South Sinai.
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Question C focuses on the government’s policies of both exclusion of the Bedouin
population in seizing the land for tourism and in encouraging migration of workers to the
newly created space from the main Egyptian population. This dynamic has impoverished
the Bedouin, encouraging sedentarization while severely limiting their ability to sustain
themselves through tourism based endeavors. This question also attempts to distinguish
between the extreme disparity in development between the North and South Sinai, which
is often cited as a main cause of the continued conflict on the peninsula and the
entrenchment of terrorist organizations within the territory. This dynamic can be
considered a vulnerability created through early planning for tourism.
Question D places the current climate of instability on the peninsula in relation to
the crisis in tourism faced by Sharm El Sheikh. Following the revolution and the
degradation of control of the central government over the Sinai, the tourism industry was
inevitably impacted. Additionally, the bombing of Metrojet flight 9268 effectively halted
tourism to the area, with the distinct lack of control by the central Egyptian government
over regaining tourism to the region. This lack of control in regaining tourism is due to
external governments halting flights, the placement of security warnings for travel to the
Sinai, and ultimately cost/benefit decision making on the part of potential tourists and
tourism agents in Europe.

1.4 Methodology

This qualitative case study analyzes government policy related decision making in
historic context and illuminates problems in the developmental foundation of the tourism
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sector in the South Sinai. As previously mentioned, the independent variable of this
project is tourism development policy with the dependent variable as the vulnerability to
instability created by this policy. Different facets of the independent variable are
operationalized through each of the research questions.
Research Question A necessitates a case study of specific development plans in
the beginning stages of resort building in the territory. Several documents are used in
sketching the history of policy. The first major wave of planning occurred with the Sinai
Development Study from USAID- a 1985 analysis of resources, potential population
relocation from central Egypt to the Sinai, proposed tourism sites, and necessary
infrastructure for future development. This report sets the tone for development and
illuminates the driving vision for the reacquired peninsula. The historic evidence for
tourism policy is furthered with the next report commissioned by The South Sinai
Governorate Environmental Action Plan in 2003. This development profile allows a look
at the rapid expansion of tourist facilities and creates an opportunity for comparison
between the early planning and the actual policies implemented by the state. Additional
points of comparison between actual development and early planning is provided by the
Sustainable Tourism Development Plan for the South Sinai commissioned by EuropeAid
in 2008 and the Assessment of the Tourism Sector in Egypt, a study conducted by
USAID in 2012.
These points of reference for policy and development require political context to
further the assertion that these policies were deliberately planned in relation to the
political climate in the 1990s and early 2000s. In the effort to provide this context, a
survey of the Middle East Economic Digest was conducted. This weekly digest
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chronicles political changes, economic conditions and advertises tenders for new projects
throughout the region. This digest is utilized to show specific economic and political
conditions faced by the Mubarak regime and the political choices made to quickly
develop the capacities for tourism in the South Sinai.
This method of tracing the development of the space utilizes government studies
alongside the weekly Middle East Economic Digest in the effort to create an unbiased
economic history of the space, while attempting to understand motivations of the
government’s plans through detailed reporting on development planning and future
targets. This data is more reliable than informant interviews, as it does not rely on
memory and is not sourced from economic elites who might be biased in interviews. This
method also provides data on hotel numbers, occupancy, and tourist arrivals, while
providing snapshots of developmental challenges facing the resort. This form of data
collection is better for analysis seeking to cover two decades, which could not be
accurately gathered through informant interviewing.
Research Question B focuses on the problematic targeting of the mass beach
tourism in the planned resorts of the South Sinai. This section relies on the criteria of the
Tourism Area Life Cycle proposed by the work of Butler and expanded upon by tourism
literature. This model shows the development and decline of tourism spaces through
distinct phases. This model exposes the problematic targeting of mass tourism, with the
phase associated with this market as being the final point before decline. The evidence
for this research question relies upon the literature associated with this model paired with
descriptions of problems facing Sharm El Sheikh and the South Sinai before the terrorist
attack of 2015. The evidence of the emerging problems within the tourism space comes
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from the reports detailed in Research Question A, conducted by EuropeAid in 2008 and
USAID in 2012 with the addition of a 2009 report from the Egyptian Center for
Economic Studies entitled, Tourism in Egypt: An Unfinished Business. Selected statistics
from CAPMAS (Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics) and the Egyptian
Ministry of Tourism are used to show changing tourism arrivals and changing hotel
occupancy within the South Sinai in the last fifteen years.
This portion relies on several of the same studies utilized to create the economic
history for Research Question A. The addition of the Tourism Area Life Cycle as a means
to understand the development path of the resort, along with selected statistics from the
Egyptian government creates the analysis of vulnerabilities in the resort. The use of the
Tourism Area Life Cycle has precedence in many studies on tourism development,
although it has been critiqued as being linear, and altered by Butler. This application also
relies on the conceptualization of Sharm el Sheikh as a resort city, however, this chapter
will present the argument for this classification for this tourism space. The use of tourism
statistics from the Egyptian state is notoriously problematic in some reports are missing
numbers, the classifications within some reports are vague, and in a few cases there are
discrepancies between different reports. These challenges limit the ability to do strong
quantitative work with these figures. However, almost all of the literature on tourism in
Egypt cites these government statistics, as there are no alternatives to this data.
Social Divisions created through tourism development policy are the focus of
Research Question C. This portion of the independent variable is operationalized through
a survey of anthropological studies of the Bedouin of the South Sinai. Hilary Gilbert, an
anthropologist studying the changing social dynamics of this population, published two
40

works, Nature=Life Environmental Identity as Resistance in South Sinai and ‘This is Not
Our Life, It’s Just a Copy of Other People’s’: Bedu and the Price of ‘Development’ in the
South Sinai, which allow the present research to survey ethnographic perspectives on the
changing social and physical landscape due to tourism development. Goodman’s book,
Contesting Identities in South Sinai: Development, Transformation and the Articulation
of a ‘Bedouin’ Identity under Egyptian Rule, Karbaki’s article Lifestyle Migration in
South Sinai, Egypt: Nationalism, Privileged Citizenship and Indigenous Rights, and
Yasmine Ramadan’s literary analysis, National or Not?: Tal’it al-badan and the
Bedouins of Sinai, all come together to enrich the present projects’ understanding of the
tensions between nationalism and identity in the state’s development project in the South
Sinai. This survey of ethnographies on the South Sinai Bedouin contextualize the
changing economic conditions faced by the population, the impacts of government policy
making in development and the social changes endured as the population contends with
the ‘modernizing’ force of the state’s economic vision for the territory.
Research Question D shifts the focus from development to examine security
policy and its relationship to the stability of the tourism sector. The terrorism threatening
the strength of tourism in Egypt during the 1990s will be analyzed using reporting in the
Middle East Economic Digest and through case study literature on the impact of this
violence on tourism indicators. The security policies pursued by the Mubarak Regime
will be discussed, as they stand as an important counterpart to the strategy of tourism
diversification examined through Research Question A. The threat of terrorism targeting
the tourism industry changed focus to the Sinai and intensified from the 1990s to the
2000s, and a renewal of conflict occurred with the regime change which occurred after
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the 2011 Uprising. The evidence for these changing policies and the escalation of
violence are detailed using news reports from the New York Times, The Economist and
the Washington Post. Conflict analysis from the Council of Foreign Relations, the Middle
East Institute and the International Crisis Group add analytic perspectives on the
changing nature of policy and conflict in the Sinai.
The quantitative data for this portion relies on figures from the Ministry of
Tourism and CAPMAS, which present some challenges discussed above: missing figures,
discrepancies and unclear classifications. This limitation is faced by every study looking
at tourism in Egypt, as there are no alternatives to this official data. This section
examines political instability and violence, however these terms present a further
limitation to our study: it is very difficult to operationalize ‘political risk’, ‘violence’, or
‘instability’ with quantitative figures due to missing information to create these variables.
Furthermore, the successive points of political change and violence lessen the ability to
make causal connections between specific periods and change in consumer demand,
change in tourism and change in competitiveness of the destination. This limitation
lessons the ability to draw specific causal connections of individual acts of violence or
moments of instability, however this project views the political climate and the conflict in
the Sinai holistically, which allows for conclusions on the vulnerability of the tourism
space.
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2. SHARM EL SHEIKH AS A DEPENDENT RESORT

This chapter addresses the first two research questions: Why did the Mubarak
Regime and economic elites seek to develop tourism in the South Sinai? What were the
economic benefits of the design and rapid development of this tourism space? How did
the planned target market for tourism create an initial vulnerability to changing external
demand? These questions center on the motivations of the Mubarak regime and the
economic elite in designing and rapidly building tourism spaces in the South Sinai. This
development sought economic stability when terrorism threatened the security of the
industry in Mainland Egypt, while allowing the regime to resist rapid structural
adjustments mandated by the International Monetary Fund. This chapter narrates the
economic history of the rise of the resort, and the almost inevitable decline of the space.
The diversification into mass beach tourism significantly bolstered Egyptian tourism for a
time, however, the reliance on the mass beach tourism model presented a vulnerability to
changing external demand, a process which is modeled by Butler’s Tourism Area
Lifecycle. This process of stagnation and decline within the South Sinai has been
accelerated by terrorism and political instability, a point which will be further expanded
upon within the chapter ‘Political Instability and Managing Tourism: Creation and
Compromise of the New Tourism Space’.
The next section, ‘Designing for the Mass Beach Tourism’ outlines the initial
planning for tourism development of the reacquired Sinai. This section contextualizes this
planning with the economic environment which motivated diversification in the tourism
industry and begins the assertion that Sharm el Sheikh was designed for the mass tourism
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market. ‘Fordist Momentum’ traces the exponential growth in tourism capabilities of the
resort over the 1990s and early 2000s, while highlighting some of the emerging problems
facing Sharm el Sheikh as a result of specifically building for the mass tourism market.
‘Structuralism on the Resort’ focuses on the economic and public policies which have
contributed to the creation and maintenance of this resort. ‘Choosing Dependency and the
Life Cycle of Sharm el Sheikh’ acts as a concluding section for this chapter which draws
on the data presented in the proceeding sections to argue for the classification of this
tourism space as a resort enclave. It seeks to compare the dependency theorist’s critiques
of resort development in the global south with the case of Sharm el Sheikh and utilizes
Butler’s Tourist Area Life Cycle to highlight vulnerabilities present in the resort.

2.1 Designing for the Mass Beach Tourist
The privatization of the tourism industry in the early 1980s led to a general
rethinking of this industry. The government sought to expand revenues by transferring
costs to the private sector and reorienting future investment into resort development, an
expansion into a new kind of tourism apart from the traditional focus on historical sites.78
Ushering in this diversification, fifteen tourist villages were planned on the Red Sea
coast, to be constructed by international companies and to be financed through forty year
leases by outside companies.79 This new emphasis on other forms of tourism had the
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Ministry focused on the Sinai before negotiations were complete on the handover from
Israel.80
Under Israeli control until 1979, the Sinai was part of negotiations for peace in the
treaty between Israel and Egypt. Egypt gained control over the area in six stages, with
Sharm el Sheikh as part of the final turnover in April 1982.81 Sharm el Sheikh was a
small, underdeveloped fishing community with very few hotels and attractions. This
space represented an economic opportunity in diversifying tourism in Egypt beyond
archeological attractions. During the transition of the Sinai, development consultants
from USAID and government officials were optimistic about the huge potential of the
tourism industry in the south.82
One recommendation that was made at this stage was tapping into the emerging
market of ‘Warm Water Beach Tourism’ defined as relatively high income visitors from
Europe seeking year round warm beaches.83 Identified as the fastest growing tourist
market, figures from this period estimated a future 200 million holiday trips from top
European markets. European tour operators projected that the Sinai could reasonably
expect capture 4 to 6 percent market share by 1990. This assessment forecasted 8 to 12
million holidays to the South Sinai. Consultants from USAID promoted a more
conservative estimate of .6 to 1.7 million visitor days in 1990.
This market share, whether looking at the optimistic potential or the more
conservative estimate promoted by the report, hinged on the ability to develop the
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physical infrastructure to cater to future tourist demand. Facilities needed to be
constructed on time and run efficiently to meet expectations of foreign visitors.
Consultants writing about these potentials in 1983 recognized that further feasibility
studies needed to be conducted along with detailed market planning and investigation of
private sector partners. However, they proposed the high potential of catering to warm
water tourism and recommended that resorts planned in the area be large scaled,
ascetically pleasing, and have the ability to command respect because of the highly
competitive nature of the industry. The resort emphasizes that anything less than the best
in resorts and other facilities would be a short term gain for the country, while sacrificing
its long term interests.84
This report of the potentials of development of the reacquired territory represents
the foundations of the vision leading to the development of Sharm el Sheikh as a
destination city filled predominately with self-sustaining resort complexes. This vision
sought to capitalize on the emerging demand for beach tourism from European markets
and sought to competitively position itself against other destinations offering sun and
sand such as the Canary Islands, the Caribbean, the Seychelles, Thailand, Malaysia and
Bali. One competitive advantage noted by this report was the comparative savings in
airfare for potential travelers originating in Europe.85 Early conceptualizing of the South
Sinai as a beach destination catering predominantly to the European market influenced
the development of Sharm el Sheikh and promoted a rapid development to meet the
demand in a timely manner.
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The development of the South Sinai had to be coordinated between the public and
the private sectors for an effective and rapid expansion of tourist facilities. Consultants on
the projected tourist market recommended the building of 50 international-class hotels
with about 5,600 rooms by the year 2000.86 This expansion required an active tourism
planning and marketing program to plan the facilities by reserving the best locations
along the coast, to develop the tourism spaces, and to maintain these spaces to cater to the
potential requirements of the tourism industry. This organization required coordination
between government institutions such as the Ministry of Development, its sub-ministry
the Sinai Development Authority and private enterprises, which at the time of this report
in 1983, had not emerged to handle large scale development. The Sinai Development
Authority was created in 1974, and by the time of the consultation conducted by USAID,
it had the largest budget of any of the Ministry of Development’s implementing
agencies.87 Consultants from USAID asserted that private enterprises needed to be
organized from outside the Sinai utilizing financial assistance, partnership agreements
and active support from the government in order to undertake largescale development of
the peninsula.88 During the time of this study, the government of Egypt was using public
enterprise units to manage economic and social development. This model was being
implemented in the Sinai as a very successful company, the Suez Canal Authority.89
In the effort to create a favorable environment for foreign investment, the
Tourism and Aviation Ministry allowed access to all of the feasibility studies completed
on tourism potential and stressed its commitment to solve any problems outside investors
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may face, especially in the acquisition of land for building new tourism facilities.90 The
Ministry sought to build as quickly as possible in the effort to generate 11% increases in
tourism per year.91 Focus shifted to areas outside of Cairo with efforts concentrated on
building luxury hotels and attracting the patronage of wealthier tourists.92
The National Plan for 1982 – 1987 budgeted 378 million LE for direct tourism
development throughout Egypt, but the government also expected a significant
investment from the private sector. Projected investments originating from the private
sector were to grow from 30 million to 50 million.93 The total planned private investment
for this period aimed for 140 million LE.94 The South Sinai was of particular interest for
this overall tourism development strategy, which sought to raise the number of hotel
rooms from 450 during 1982 to 850 at the end of 1987.95 Furthermore, the strategy for
growth until the year 2000 sought to capture .6 – 1.7 million visitor days during 1990 and
1 – 3.7 million visitor days in the year 2000. While the government sought to double the
hotel rooms in the area by 1987, by 1990 they aimed to have between 1120 – 3480 hotel
rooms. Even more ambitiously, by the year 2000, there should be 2000 – 7420 hotel
rooms available in the South Sinai.96
With the return of the Sinai to Egypt, the potential for development of the
territory was recognized by Egyptian officials and international consultants. Tourism
particularly in the South Sinai was identified as a very important feature of development,
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which if effectively planned could generate many additional tourists nights within the
country. Sun and sand tourism catering to European mass package tourism was identified
as a growing market for which the South Sinai could pose an advantage over competing
destinations in lower travel costs and closer proximity to Europe. The initial planning for
tourism development sought to capture part of this market by planning resorts around the
desires of the European tourist.

2.2 Fordist Momentum
Revitalized focus on tourism nationwide and the newly emerging plan for
development in the Sinai sparked beneficial changes in policy for the territory.97 In 1985,
the Egyptian government began selling land to local investors for tourism development,
this land sold for $6 – 12 dollars per square meter.98 The government also placed
stringent conditions on the land: investors must establish the seriousness of their plan
along with a deposit of 20% of the lands worth in the effort to promote fast development
and to prevent investors from waiting for price increases on the land.99 Airline rules were
also liberalized, meaning charter services were now allowed to bypass Cairo and fly
directly to resort locations.100 The new tourism Minister also chose to further
privatization of state run hotels which were running poorly. More international firms
were allowed to manage and operate these hotels through 25 year contracts providing
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unprecedented autonomy for these companies.101 Infrastructure in support of tourism
developments outside Cairo received a pledge of $600 million in loans from the World
Bank, neighboring Arab states, and the Kuwait-based Arab Fund for Social and
Economic Development.102 Increased private investment in the sector, especially in resort
tourism, stemmed from policy changes nationally and plans for increased infrastructure
supporting tourism outside Cairo.103
The late 1980s witnessed an increase in tourism developments in beachside
locations, including a slow beginning to building in Sharm El Sheikh. Developments in
Hurghada dominated this period, highlighting some potential struggles for investing in
the South Sinai. The new facilities in Hurghada were planned haphazardly, facing
problems in logistics in terms of water sewage and power, ultimately falling short of
international standards.104 These challenges posed a warning for increased investments in
the Sinai, causing investors to create provisions for proper standards, infrastructure
services, and the maintenance of the eco-system of the Red Sea. Simultaneously,
although slowly, international firms began building hotels using foreign companies to
construct and supply the tourist facilities within Sharm el Sheikh. This included a large
complex at Tiger Bay in 1987 (built by Badr Investment Company and a firm in
Singapore), and a tourist village backed by Abu Dhabi Tourism Investment Company.105
The tension between structural adjustments and the deliberately piecemeal
approach taken by the Mubarak government laid a foundation for the planned
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privatization taking place in the early to mid-1990s. In 1991, Citibank and the UK’s
Coopers and Lybrand conducted a study about the privatization of tourism facilities
which was financed by the World Bank’s contribution to the infrastructure fund set up in
support of tourism.106 Among the first public companies to be opened to private capital
was the Misr Hotels Company and several assets of the holding company Egyptian
General Company for Tourism and Hotels.107 Part of the sale of the Misr Hotels
Company’s shares included its investment in the Sinai Company for Hotels and SubAqua clubs, which owned several of the hotels in Sharm el Sheikh at that time.108 In
1993, the Misr Company for Touristic Villages, owner of the Fayruz Hilton in Sharm el
Sheikh, was privatized.
The mid-1990s there was an increase in the development Sharm el Sheikh.
Tourist sector assets were being privatized nationally, including the South Sinai’s
facilities. This created a new environment encouraging investment and inspired domestic
and foreign companies to cooperate in largescale joint ventures within the city. Making
the area even more attractive, the South Sinai had been immune to the tourism declines
nationwide due to terrorist attacks. In 1994, the three five star hotels in the area were
operating at 100% occupancy.109 Shaikh Coast, an Italian company which owned a 75%
stake in a national company controlling 340,000 meters of land in Sharm el Sheikh,
began work on a massive five star resort complex offering 300 beds, 150 apartments and
60 villas.110 Raja Travel and Hotels, a domestic company, sought to build a $30 million
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dollar hotel in 1994. Two additional luxury hotels, Marriot and Inter-Continental, opened
their doors in 1995.111
The national declines in tourism due to terrorist attacks in the early 1990s were
not replicated in the burgeoning tourism spaces in the South Sinai. After a short period of
terrorist activity decline and subsequent feeling of security produced by returning
tourists, the Luxor Massacre in 1997 reinforced the need for diversification of the tourism
sector. This surprising terrorist attack cost the Egyptian economy $205 in tourism
revenue and significantly decreased monthly tourism arrivals for the six month period
following the massacre. This act of violence and the downturn within the tourism
industry created an increased sense of urgency in the building of alternative tourism
spaces in the South Sinai. The regime regarded the new resorts as a safeguard to the
fragile national industry and, to economic elites, the new developments seemed to be safe
investments as occupancy rates in hotels were significantly higher than national average.
The loss in tourism coincides with an exponential increase in building new hotels in the
Sinai, which experienced a growth rate of over 300% over the next decade.112
The late 1990s showed an exponential growth in hotels in Sharm el Sheikh,
among the new developments were huge luxury hotels. In 1996, 12 hotels were located in
the Naama Bay area mostly owned by private Egyptian interests.113 Hyatt International
undertook a contract to manage a new hotel developed domestically in the Naama Bay
area to be opened in 1997.114 The Moevenpick was set to expand its facilities through $20
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million dollars of bonds for new villas and a golf course.115 Saudi backed Nesco Egypt
for Tourism Developments sought to construct a $15 million dollar four star hotel in 1995
and a $60 million Four Seasons resort began construction in 1997, backed by Prince
Alwaleed Bin Tawal Bin Abdulaziz and a local contractor.116 At the beginning of 1998,
Arab Contractors (Osman Ahmed Osman & Company) signed a contract to build the $8
million dollar Shalalat Hilton for the Arab International Hotels Company.117 The Arab
Contractors were also commissioned to build the first stage of a five star resort at Nabaq
Bay for Oriental Resorts Company, in a contract valued at $20 million.118 The Nabaq Bay
resort was part of a larger tourism complex, which this 300 room and 60 chalet hotel
marked the beginning of the development. This complex was commissioned by the
Charming Sharm Company, a venture owned by 28 local business groups set to build
hotels within the complex.119
Unlike the hasty and unplanned development in Hurghada, which left the area
with major infrastructural challenges, fractured planning in between resorts, and
ecological threats, the planning in Sharm el Sheikh was an attempt to avoid the same
mistakes. In the Naama Bay area, a boardwalk connects the major luxury hotels and
offers a sense of community, although manufactured.120 Construction on new facilities
was controlled by building permits limiting how close new developments could be to the
sea and limiting building to two stories.121 Several resorts also attempted to avoid
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infrastructural problems by building their own desalination, power, and sewage systems.
The land within the Sharm el Sheikh coast had been set aside for tourism development,
sold to Egyptian private investors, and then allowed to be developed rapidly and
individually by these private interests. Projects had to be approved by local authorities,
but were largely uncontrolled in what kind of facilities were built on private land. Sharm
el Sheikh was able to avoid many of the mistakes made by developers in Hurghada,
however the rapid and individualized nature of building created a problem of oversupply
in the market.
The early study conducted by USAID consultants, which looked at a possible
comprehensive development strategy for the entire Sinai Peninsula, promoted the
importance of capturing mass tourism emanating from the European market. Another
study conducted in the early 2000’s allows an examination of the government’s response
to the early recommendations of USAID. USAID stressed the potential for rapid growth
and expansive tourism for sun and sand, with the development of the South Sinai
reflecting an adherence to this development strategy.
The projections of the tourism capacities of the South Sinai by the USAID
consultants made in 1983 were surpassed by the year 2000, the actual capacity more than
doubled the projected 2000 – 7480 hotel rooms. The rapid development of the area took
place between 1996 and 2003, coinciding with the crisis in the national industry posed by
continuing terrorist violence. South Sinai tourism accommodations grew from 88 total
tourist establishments with 6979 rooms in 1996 to 221 establishments and 35782 rooms
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by the year 2003.122 This expansion averages 27% increases in capacities year over year,
with some years showing a growth of around 40%. The average growth in South Sinai
hotel rooms between 1996 and 2003 was especially high for four and five star
accommodations: five star hotels saw an average of 44.6% growth and four star rooms
grew by 32.7%. This growth in capacities within the South Sinai was heavily
concentrated in Sharm el Sheikh which held 73% of available accommodations, 88% of
the five star hotels in the South Sinai.123 The particular emphasis on the highest end
establishments reflects the types of tourists visiting the area, the priorities of developers,
and the projected increase in affluent tourism.
Resorts and tourist villages dominated the hotel landscape of the South Sinai, and
because they were a highly profitable venture, remained an active area for private
investment. Investors sought to build as quickly as possible because the construction
costs for hotels often paid for themselves within a few years.124 These establishments
were often 4 to 5 star establishments, in the effort to capture the European market, and
strategically attempted to keep guests within the resort by catering to most of their needs.
These resorts also often had their own source of power generation and their own
desalination plants, which aided in efficient functioning of individual resorts and
curtailing ecological threats to the environment. Although the development of Sharm el
Sheikh attempted to create a sense of an integrated city, the individualized resort enclaves
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not only supported themselves but retained a large percentage of profits due to the lack of
incentive for the resort goer to venture outside.
The study conducted in 2003 of the history of development of the South Sinai
commissioned by the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency noted the rapid growth of
tourism capacities in the area and discussed potential future issues in development of this
sector. It is noted that at the time of the report, in less than 20 years, the South Sinai
represented more than 20% of the overall tourism capacity of Egypt and generated
around 25% of tourism’s contribution to the gross domestic product. Consultants writing
in 2003 projected that this region could be responsible for 40% of Egyptian tourism by
2013.125 This report expects that the success in the South Sinai will continue and grow,
however, there were a few issues outlined to address to ensure the continued success.
The issues with the growth of the tourism capacities in the South Sinai were
identified as: threats posed by outside regional and world events, environmental
destruction, undiversified tourist economy, and internal competition.126 While overall
tourism in Egypt is very sensitive to world and regional events, this study noted that
tourism to Sharm el Sheikh seemed to be less affected by outside events. However, many
tourist establishments could fail if long term crisis happens to impact tourism to the area.
Consultants noted the possibility for the deterioration of the environment, specifically to
the coral reef systems and marine life, both of which are highly unique draws to the Sinai.
At the time of this study, there was an observed beginning of deterioration due to
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pollution, unregulated fishing, and tourism activities. This was and remains a serious
issue for the South Sinai, as the period of 1987 – 1996 sustained a 20 – 30% decrease in
live coral cover.127
The tourism market within the area was noted at this time as highly undiversified
and susceptible to price cuts due to internal competition. The undiversified nature of
tourism occurred because the overwhelming majority of tourists visiting the area seek
resort activities. This was described as problematic for consultants in 2003 due to the
potential inability of the tourist industry to sustain fluctuations in consumer demand.128
Consultants recommended a diversification through religious sites, eco-tourism, and
desert treks. Marketing for the area should not only attempt to offer these additional
activities to the resort and sea tourist, but also attempt to attract visitors specifically for
these other attractions in the South Sinai. It is noted that Sharm el Sheikh, in this period,
was already expanding its offerings through hosting national and international
conferences.129 An additional challenge requiring diversification was the amount of high
end establishments within Sharm el Sheikh and the broader South Sinai. As discussed
above, high end tourist accommodations witnessed disproportional growth between 1996
and 2003. One final note on the potential dangers within the tourism market was the
tendency of competitors to significantly undercut each other in pricing, which both
threatened the economic viability of establishments and had the potential to halt further
property investments.130
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The consultation in 2003 speaks to the projections offered by the Sinai
Development plan drafted by international consultants in 1983. The earlier development
plan emphasized the capacity for success within a tourist industry focused on the growing
market of European guests seeking sun and sand vacations. In line with this early vision,
the South Sinai almost exclusively focused on resort developments catering to this
market. The high end resort developments grew substantially year after year, far
surpassing the early projected numbers of accommodations in the area. While consultants
examining South Sinai development warned of the potential dangers of an undiversified
tourism market in the region, their assessment was optimistic about the continued growth
and success of resort tourism in the South Sinai. The 1990s was a period of exponential
growth for the tourism capacities of the South Sinai. Tourism facilities outgrew early
projections, as a result of government policies encouraging rapid growth and creating an
attractive environment for private investment. For the Mubarak Regime, the rapid
development of this new resort presented an opportunity to stabilize the national tourist
sector when challenged by terrorism. Although problems began to emerge from this rapid
development, the regime continued to promote further development of tourism facilities
in the resort.

2.3 Structuralism on the Resort
Since the 1980s beach tourism in Egypt attracted the majority of new and repeat
visitors to the county. Beach tourism represented 82% of arrivals and about 90% of

58

private investment in the tourism industry by the year 2012.131 There was a conscious
decision by the central government to develop the South Sinai to cater to the growing
industry of mass beach tourism. The central government recognized several fiscal
benefits nationally through the venture into sun and sand tourism, such as gaining foreign
currency, expanding employment opportunities and generating revenues which offset
budget deficits. The economic importance of this diversification of the tourism sector was
emphasized with the instability created by terrorism in the 1990s. The regime was
emboldened by the Luxor Massacre to rapidly develop tourism capacities removed from
terrorist activity in mainland Egypt. The government implemented liberalization policies
alongside privatization to encourage private investment in the new resort areas of the
South Sinai.
Under Sadat in the 1970s, the overall management of the tourism sector was
transferred Ministry of Tourism, allowing the ministry the ability to regulate the sector.132
The ministry gained the power to set standards and pricing for hotels. Shortly after, the
ministry gained the exclusive ability to designate territory for tourism development and
expansion.133 Foreign investment was incentivized in the early 1970s through the new
ability to build joint ventures with domestic partners, tax exemptions of 15 years and a
new guarantee of property rights for real-estate holdings and capital investments.134
Foreign investors were given the ability to repatriate profits overseas and to withdraw
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their investment without obstacles.135 Further liberalization of the tourism sector occurred
in the 1980s. Among these opening polices was the canceling of import restrictions on
products related to the tourism sector, reducing the prices of land along the Red Sea to
encourage private investment, approving foreign management of public hotels, and the
expansion of Egypt Air’s operations to underserviced destinations.136 This incremental
opening of the sector started before major investment in the Sinai, but demonstrated the
willingness of the government to encourage foreign involvement, support foreign and
domestic private investment, and laid the foundations for future development of the Sinai.
The 1990s presented a period of fluctuation in tourism, which the Sinai was
largely immune. This stability in the market along with the potential for large return on
new investments peaked investor interest in the territory. The Ministry of Tourism
focused on building infrastructural capabilities to support expanding areas such as the
South Sinai Coast. The creation of the Tourism Development Authority (TDA)
centralized fragmented planning and created a comprehensive plan for tourism
development.137 Following the creation of this authority, private investment grew rapidly
in the South Sinai.
The TDA created the framework controlling development in the South Sinai. It
quickly sold remote coastal land to private domestic investors, who reaped substantial
benefits in these sales. This land was valueless public land, turned private assets through
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sales and then became exponentially valuable through their exclusive designation as
tourism development areas.138 Land sold and then deemed tourism development areas
exceeded its original price in some cases by almost 10000% after signing contracts with
the TDA. This artificial inflation in land prices exemplifies regime patronage to elites
willing to invest in the early stages of development in the Sinai. Early investors in the
South Sinai gained huge profits over night, and investments in developing the land not
only recouped their investments extremely quickly, but continued to turn huge profits
year after year. The building of tourism complexes often paid for themselves within two
years and only needed an occupancy rate of 30% to remain open.139 The design and
construction of these large resorts in Sharm el Sheikh was handled by both foreign and
domestic companies. The ownership of the complexes often remained with Egyptian
investors due to the legal framework in the Sinai requiring at least 51% Egyptian
ownership. The management of these resorts were contracted out to international
hoteliers, who usually received 2% turnover and 10% of the profits.140 The potential for
high return on investment, coupled with the South Sinai’s perceived immunity from
tourism fluctuations experienced by the rest of the country, created extremely favorable
conditions for private investors in the late 1990s.
The profitable private investor environment, the government’s emphasis on rapid
expansion, and the perception of exponentially growing demand from European mass
beach tourism quickly produced conditions of over-supply. While liberalization and legal
reforms favoring privatization have been profitable for the Egyptian elite investors, the
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sector lacked specified planning and coordination which has led to several negative and
undesirable economic, social, environmental and cultural impacts. Lack of planning
damaged the environment, created dissatisfaction from local communities, and
oversupply in the sector led to reduction in prices and devaluation of investments.
The unique aspect of Sharm el Sheikh is the large and diverse coral reefs, which
separates the location from other sun and sand destinations. This coastline houses 200
species of corals exclusive to Egypt.141 There are a large number of species of fish and
turtles living in the coast, which are also unique to the ecosystem. Several activities
related to tourism affect the lifespan of this special feature of the South Sinai. Tourism
facilities (hotels, marinas, golf courses and infrastructure), generation of waste, and
tourist activities threaten to deteriorate the environment. Facilities built very close to the
sea impact the reefs and species of aquatic life, while golf courses and marinas change
the shoreline, destroy reefs and cause sedimentation. Resorts in Sharm el Sheikh often
include their own marinas and golf courses to try to remain competitive.142 Tourism
activities also impact the reefs as tourists may intentionally damage them for souvenirs
and throw waste into the sea.143 The overemphasis on quantity of tourism rather than
quality contributes to the deteriorating environment around the city and threatens future
tourism. While Egypt has a sufficient number of environment related institutions and
regulations, the institutions do not function effectively and fail in their ability to
effectively implement these policies.144 This inability to properly enforce environmental
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regulations has been observed by international consultants seeking to evaluate the
environmental impacts of rapid tourism development in the South Sinai.145
The rapid expansion of tourism accommodations in the area and the high price
points for a majority of the hotels has led to an oversupply of luxury resorts. This poses a
new challenge to tourism in the area because of the elastic demand for the kind of holiday
offered in Sharm el Sheikh. Sun and sand tourism is homogeneous in the sense that the
destinations are easily substitutable.146 Assessments of the tourism sector warns of the
danger in this fickle form of tourism in that it is dangerously price-sensitive and creates
cut throat competition to offer the lowest prices in the market among resorts.147 The
intense competition keeping prices low attracts budget holiday makers further
deteriorating the social class of visiting tourists. The Red Sea has begun to be perceived
as a low-price and low quality destination. The types of tourists historically which visited
Sharm el Sheikh were the most budget constrained overall and consumed the least
amount of domestic services. Russian tourists mainly purchase all-inclusive packages
which allowed very small profits for domestic profits.148 These all-inclusive packages
drive down prices and allow very little profits for business and services outside the resort.
Several problems had emerged within Sharm el Sheikh due to government
encouragement of rapid growth, a lack of oversight for spatial planning and the rush to
develop the space by economic elites. International consultants evaluating structural
problems in Sharm el Sheikh have identified an increase in competition both within the
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resort and against competing destinations, a decline in price points and reputation and the
beginning of ecological decline. These emerging vulnerabilities to decline can be used to
analyze the resort’s similarities with other global south resorts and apply the model of the
Tourism Area Life Cycle.

2.4 Stagnation in the Life Cycle of Sharm el Sheikh
This section argues that following the rapid development of Sharm el Sheikh, the
resort was in a critical stage of development according to the model of the Tourism Area
Life Cycle. Because of this critical stage, the resort was especially vulnerable to decline.
Sharm el Sheikh and the wider South Sinai experienced rapid development according to
perceived demand coming from the European market. This momentum of development is
seen in other tourism destinations, which experience a period of decline following the
rapid development phase. This connection between development and decline has been
theorized by the work of Butler in his Tourist Area Life which presents a linear evolution
of a space based on the product cycle concept.149 The figure below illustrates the
theorized linear development of tourist areas.
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Figure 1: The Tourist Area Life Cycle of Evolution (Butler, 1980)

This process begins with a small number of visitors as the space is restricted by
access and lack of awareness, followed by growing facilities and awareness. Popularity
spreads through the introduction of marketing and the quick expansion of facilities. The
development stage is the point where local businesses are replaced by international
business, the landscape of the area changes to suit tourism, and the type of tourists
visiting changing from individual adventure based to institutionalized, seeking
homogeneous experiences.150 Following the development stage, periods of consolidation
and stagnation occur characterized by major international franchises represented in the
area, well defined tourism business districts, capacity levels being exceeded, and a
decline in image from fashionable to well-known and outdated. Stagnation also manifests
in imported and artificial facilities, surplus in accommodation, and a heavy reliance on
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repeat visitation. The type of visitor also moves from individual to mass based tourism.151
The stagnation of the destination occurs when visitor numbers drop as the capacity of the
place begins to decline. Butler identified reasons for the decrease in capacity as
environmental factors, logistic factors, and societal factors, such as crowding and
resentment towards tourists visiting the area.152 For Butler, the period of stagnation is
critical, as it can lead either to decline, where the destination can no longer compete with
other attractions, or renewal, through which a destination must reorient its tourism aims
and attractions.
Putra and Hitchcock apply the Tourism Area Life Cycle to the experience of Bali
following the bombings of 2012. These bombings produced the worst downturn faced by
Bali tourism; while the government implemented several national and local initiatives to
revive the tourism industry, this explanation alone cannot account for the resurgence in
tourism to the destination.153 Utilizing the Tourism Area Life Cycle, Putra and Hitchcock
assert that the strong growth in tourism following the stabilization of the security
situation on the island can be accounted for the underlying development phase of the
area. Bali had not yet reached the point of consolidation within Butler’s model, which
means the development continued and led to a strong recovery and growth.154 This study
utilizes Butler’s model to explain the recovery of tourism in Bali, while for the case
examined in our project, the model can explain the opposite effect.
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If we apply the Tourism Area Life Cycle to the case of Sharm el Sheikh, there are
several features which align with the periods of consolidation and stagnation described by
Butler. Before the crash, which ushered in the extreme decline in tourism, many of the
successful hotels in the city were franchises of large hotel chains. These hotels were
experiencing fierce competition amongst themselves to secure business through the
predominantly mass tourism based guests coming into the city. Mass beach tourism was
becoming responsible for the majority of visitors, which is described in Butler’s model as
part of the stagnation phase of development. The city itself was largely built to cater
towards tourism activities, had developed inauthentic facilities for hosting tourists and the
space had excluded the Bedouin locals once living on the coast. The exclusion of local
populations will be covered within the next chapter, although it is noted here that this is
part of the classification of stagnation. With these features of stagnation, the city had
reached its capacity for accommodations through an oversupply. This oversupply is
evident in the trends in changing number of hotels before the crash. In 2003, there were
221 hotels in the South Sinai, which fell to 187 by 2006 and rose briefly to 196 in 2009.
Since 2009, hotel numbers have declined: 181 in 2010, 175 in 2012, 158 in 2014, and 111
in 2015.155 The last year that CAPMAS counted hotels in the South Sinai was the 2015
figure at 111. This was a significant decline from 221 twelve years earlier. This hotel loss
could be partially due to the decline in tourism since 2011, but this trend had begun 8
years prior. The falling hotel numbers and the reliance on tourists coming from mass
tourism indicate that Sharm el Sheikh had entered the stagnation phase of Butler’s model,
implying that any external shock to tourism would make recovery very difficult without a
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substantive reorientation in the attractions within the region and the type of tourist
coming to the destination.
Sharm el Sheikh sped through the linear development modeled by the Tourism
Area Life Cycle because of government policies encouraging rapid development.
Although the quick development of this resort held many economic benefits for the
regime and elites, the two and a half decades of development for the mass tourism market
has brought Sharm el Sheikh to a critical point, according to Butler’s model. This critical
point could lead to rejuvenation or decline, based on policy choices, but due to political
violence and insecurity, the resort is experiencing a decline. The race towards stagnation
was partially due to the marketing towards mass beach tourism, a key feature of
stagnation within the Tourism Area Life Cycle model. The next section will discuss
theoretical implications of the focus on mass beach tourism and will compare the
experience of Sharm el Sheikh to other destinations in the global south.

2.5 Choosing Dependency and Problems with the Mass Tourism Model
Capturing the mass tourism market emerging from Europe was the expressed goal
of the regime in the development of Sharm el Sheikh. Previous sections have discussed
the motivations for this model of development and the last section framed this goal as one
component of the critical point in resort development. This section will expand on the
vulnerability of Sharm el Sheikh in this critical moment by applying dependency theory
and comparing the experience of Sharm el Sheikh to other global south resort enclaves.
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Tourism literature utilizing the dependency discourse aids in our understanding of
the development of Sharm el Sheikh, but the case study poses important deviations to this
view of global south tourism. Dependency theorists examining global south tourism see
the exploitation and consumption of the destination through profit leakages, foreign
management and ownership of tourist facilities, and the conceptualization and
development of the space as homogeneous and interchangeable. The role of government
policies creates a major distinction in the case study of Sharm el Sheikh. The next
subsection, ‘Deviations from the Dependency Model’, expands on the ways Sharm el
Sheikh deviates from the standard resort characterized by dependency. Sharm el Sheikh
proves divergent in several ways: demonstrated agency in planning by the central
government, large profit margins for local elites, and the maintenance of profits of large
hotels due to structural frameworks of management contracts. Following the discussion
of these differences, ‘Similarities with the Dependency Model’ examines how Sharm el
Sheikh aligns with dependency theory related critiques of destinations in the global south.
The similarities of the case study with other global south destinations characterized by
dependency are many: designed as resort enclave, Fordism created demand and
influenced growth, homogenization of the destination, ecological damage, little revenue
for local small business, lack of control over demand, and loss of control when external
shocks threaten the numbers of tourists.

2.5.1 Deviations from the Dependency Model
One major critique of the tenants of dependency is the over emphasis on the
external factors in the development of internal tourism industries. While the desires and
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needs of the west drove the nature and style of development in the wider South Sinai, we
cannot ignore the collective agency in planning for this development. It is important to
note that when the government sought a plan of development for the area, they
specifically marked Sharm el Sheikh as having a unique ability to tap into the mass
package tourism coming out of Europe, which was a fast growing portion of the
international tourism industry. In this vein, Sharm el Sheikh capitalized on its sand and
sea features and the government attempted to grow the accommodations of the area very
quickly to capture a share of the demand. The initial planning strategy and subsequent
studies warned the government about the over reliance on the sun/sea features of the area,
recommending a diversification of the offerings of the territory. The government
miscalculated continued demand for more luxury all-inclusive resorts at the same price
points, and expressed its agency in encouraging rapid development of the area to suit the
needs of projected future tourism from the European middle class.
Unlike other destinations in the global south, Sharm el Sheikh expanded using
different contractual policies which impacted control over profits. The Sinai’s land was
sold to domestic business elites, and was designated as tourism development sites which
exponentially grew the value of the land. This land was either developed by initial
investors or was sold to other domestic owners who could develop the sites. The
government policies for the Sinai stipulate that ownership must be at least 51% Egyptian.
This creates conditions where the land and constructed resorts remain in control of elites,
but are contracted out to international operators. The provisions of these contracts favor
domestic investors as the average contract allows for the operators to gain 2% turnover
and 10% of profits. In other cases, ownership or a large amount of the profits on resorts
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are considered ‘leakages’, or they return to the international operators and permanently
leave the country. This is a very important distinction in the dependency argument.
Theorists argue that because destinations lose a significant portion of proceeds through
these ‘leakages’, the international community exploits the global south destination. This
is not the case in Sharm el Sheikh as a majority of the profits remain with the business
elite, but the profits do not benefit the government or the vast majority of the population.
This subsection has discussed several key differences between Sharm el Sheikh
and the typical dependent resort in the global south. These differences stem from
government decision making, such as the policies related to ownership of resort facilities.
Government decision making specifically sought to build this resort as an enclave for
mass tourism, which aligns Sharm el Sheikh with other dependent resorts, despite
ownership remaining with the domestic elite. The next subsection will outline the
characteristics which classify Sharm el Sheikh as a dependent resort, despite the major
difference of government decision making.

2.5.2 Similarities with the Dependency Model
Sharm el Sheikh possesses characteristics which are similar to dependent resorts
in the global south. This resort was designed as a resort enclave, demand and growth has
been influenced by Fordism, it is homogenous with other destinations, and it has suffered
ecological damage as a result of tourism activities. Furthermore, there is little revenue for
small businesses. Control over the resort is limited in fundamental ways: there is a lack of
control over demand and a loss of control when external shocks threaten the number of
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tourists. These characteristics will be presented in this subsection, followed by a
conclusion concerning this lack of power in maintaining demand for mass tourism.
The resort enclave model is fundamentally connected to fordist demand and
design, which manifests in homogenized tourism spaces. The classification of a tourism
space as a resort enclave is an important component of the argument of this project, and
Sharm el Sheikh shares many features with this model. The main tenants of dependency
theory used by scholars looking at tourism in the global south contend that tourist
enclaves are built for western interests, maintained by western entities, and necessarily
exploit the host country within the periphery. This theorized structure is the basis for the
argument of dependency in the reliance on outside demand, outside tour operators and
hotel operators, and the use (and sometimes destruction) of the destination until more
preferable destinations gain traction. The combination of these assertions results in the
conclusion that this system perpetuates chronic underdevelopment in host countries. The
tourist enclave perfectly illuminates the argument of dependency theorists looking at the
global south.
The tourism enclave is a strategy for development of a territory attempting to
serve the needs of mass tourism. The tourism enclave provides a closed area created for
tourists, who often are taken directly to their resort upon arrival.156 Jenkins describes the
enclave structure as being detached from the host community and one whose purpose is
not to benefit the local community.157 These created spaces are used entirely by tourists
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and are built and managed by international corporations. This kind of resort discourages
the movement of the foreign tourist outside of the walls of the enclave area. Separation
between the tourist and the local population occurs, which embodies a form of neocolonialization.158 The development of tourism enclaves occurs when circumstances are
controlled by multinational corporations or other external actors and are often a
manifestation of power inequalities.159 This understanding of enclave tourism fits the
structure of Sharm el Sheikh, although some areas were designed to generate a sense of
community. The all-inclusive resorts deter the need to move beyond the walls and
assessments of the tourism industry there have found that many tourists never leave the
compound. These homogenized resorts are fabricated for the needs of the tourist and are
divorced from the surrounding community. The case of Sharm el Sheikh deviates from
the standard dependency model of profit leakages from destination countries to
multinational corporations. The control of multinational corporations in Sharm el Sheikh
is limited by policies restricting foreign ownership. However, the majority of the profits
from the resort remain with the domestic elite which are not connected to the population
in the Sinai, a point which will be heavily expanded upon in the following chapter.
The previous paragraphs have classified Sharm el Sheikh as a resort enclave and
expanded upon the ways in which this model fits dependency theory based critiques of
mass tourism. The next major point where Sharm el Sheikh complies with the
dependency model of tourism development is the design and development ultimately
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stemming from Fordism. This economic system is characterized by mass production and
mass consumption, which can be expressed through mass tourism. Mowforth and Munt
view mass tourism as an expression of cultural dependency. Locations seeking to attract
the mass tourist market result in creating a homogenized package, divorced from the
surrounding economic, cultural and physical environment. For these researchers, this
older form of tourism is characterized by Fordism and is designed in the west specifically
for western interests.160 Waleed Hazbun was the first to apply Fordism to resort
development in the Mediterranean through his in depth look at the Tunisian tourism
industry.161 This work by Hazbun illuminates several important similarities in the
creation of the tourism space for the mass package tourist.
Hazbun asserts the Tunisian beach economy was directly influenced by the
demand of industrialized Europe’s growing middle class and it supplied a standardized
product which was place substitutable.162 For Hazbun, Fordism characterized both the
growing demand for mass beach tourism, through growing consumerism and its ability to
sustain expanding destinations in the Mediterranean, and the incorporation of Tunisia into
this supply-demand structure.163 Like other destinations in the region, the early growth of
the Tunisian beach industry was marked by standardization, reliance on strategies of
international hotel chains, little control over the demand, and the desire to build supply
with little capital to make sure their product remained competitive.164 The standardization
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of the product created highly interchangeable destinations which eventually had to fight
for the business of international tour companies who sought the cheapest rates. Although
the development of Sharm el Sheikh occurred over two decades after the Tunisian model,
there are important similarities between the cases. The initial strategies of both
governments was to create as much supply as possible according to the projected
demands and desires of the European middle class. In Egypt, private investment in this
budding area of the tourist sector was highly attractive because of policy changes,
perceived growth in demand, and the probability of gaining huge profits. The tourist
industry in Tunisia in the early 1970s was characterized by highly homogenized hotels
offering all-inclusive amenities which resulted in the majority of bookings coming
through tour operators outside of the country, with the tourist experience being limited to
the confines of the resort.165 Sharm el Sheikh faced the same problem, a majority of the
tourism into the city was confined to the five star resorts and was dominated by package
tourism from Russia, Eastern Europe and Great Britain. When Tunisia faced its initial
crisis in occupancy and arrivals, combined with the pressure to drop rates to stay
competitive, the government responded with a tighter control of the industry. Specifically
the government continued to grow the hotels and amenities but instituted price ceilings
resulting in the continued building of accommodations at lower price points. The
government in Egypt has yet to tighten control over the industry in Sharm el Sheikh. The
accommodations in the city have grown very quickly, are unregulated in terms of price
range, and heavily rely on the demand from mass package tourism. Furthermore, as the
last major study over South Sinai tourism mentions, the many government bodies
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involved in tourism in the region contribute to the lack of oversight in development and
the lack of central planning necessary to gain control in the way the Tunisian government
did in the in the late 1970s.
The model of the resort enclave fits the case of Sharm el Sheikh, and the resort
matches several key characteristics of fordist development in tourism as advanced by the
work of Hazbun. One major characteristic is the homogenization of the tourist space.
This feature is very important to our case, as it makes the resort highly substitutable
which contributes to destination substitution for a variety of reasons. . For Mowforth and
Munt, this homogenization of vacation spaces is a manifestation of cultural globalization,
created by a standardized form of consumerism.166 Consumers within the mass tourism
model perpetuate the homogenized nature of beach resorts through their indiscriminate
consumption based on low prices and a disregard for the local culture of the destination.
For Hazbun, the homogenized nature of mass tourism beach destinations produces a form
of deterritorialization, where a complete disregard for specific unique aspects of a
destination and local culture occurs, which further contributes to the interchangeability of
the destination.167 Our case study exemplifies the deterritorialization discussed by
Hazbun and the homogenized nature of the resort enclave. The enclaves of the city are
built as standard versions of international hotels. They were built to be consumed by
European holiday makers seeking year round warm water beaches and because of the
manifestation of that consumer preference, the destination has become interchangeable.
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This interchangeability generates several problems currently faced by the city: extreme
competition over pricing in the space, lack of control over pricing due to external tour
operators seeking the best prices between destinations, and the ability for external shocks
to impact the amount of tourists visiting the space.
Pricing and control over profit are issues faced by these homogenized tourist
spaces and can be illuminated through the example of Sharm el Sheikh. It is a necessity
that these spaces remain competitive against international competitors offering similar
holidays. This drives the pricing very low, and in a space like Sharm el Sheikh, whose
market was facing oversupply due to unrestrained growth, the need to remain competitive
was pressing. Analysis in the early 2000s comments upon the fierce competition among
resorts to book the tourists coming into the city. This drove prices very low and as a
result threatened private investments and the overall quality of the resort. The perception
of tourists is altered as a result because the lower prices coupled with a higher number of
visitors drive away the higher end clientele, who begin see the destination as low quality.
This creates a cycle which is difficult to recover from as it continually lowers prices as it
exclusively captures the lower end of holiday makers. Besides the domestic competition
for resort occupancy, the space must contend with international competition. International
tour agencies dealing with mass tourism based packages have a significant amount of
leverage in setting prices for destinations. These companies pursue the cheapest
destinations to expand their profit margins and to gain the most clients. This dynamic
impacted Sharm el Sheikh because of its reliance upon these mass tourism packages. A
significant number of visitors to the city came through these channels, which further
drives down resort prices. This structure demonstrates the argument that resort enclaves
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in the global south have a distinct lack of control over the pricing of the destination and
lose a significant amount of profits because of the extremely low pricing.
Homogenization of the tourism space contributes to higher competition for the mass
tourism market. This higher competition creates a race to the bottom, were destinations
lower prices against internal competitors and against alternate destinations.
The final similarity between the present case study and other resort destinations
in the global south is the threat of ecological damage to the site. This is particularly
important for Sharm el Sheikh because it boasts a large and diverse coral reef system
housing unique forms of plant and animal life. This feature of the space, although not the
main driving factor in tourism, can be used to generate higher numbers of tourists. Mass
tourism necessarily emphasizes quantity over quality, which stretches the ability for the
area to sustainably handle this large amount of traffic. The effects of this form of tourism
is evident in the beginning of the destruction of the reefs through infrastructural problems
and tourism activities. Other destinations have faced this degradation, and this process is
described as a part of the life cycle of a destination described by Butler (as discussed in
the previous section).168 Butler’s model describes the process of the rise and fall of
destinations, and ecological damage of the space is a main feature of the point of
stagnation or decline. As the environment is damaged, from exceeding the inherent
capacity of the site, there is a decline in the quality of visitors and experience which leads
to less money to rejuvenate the space.169 Ecological damage from mass tourism is a
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feature shared by many destinations in the global south and this process ultimately
permanently degrades the tourism space.

2.5.3 Vulnerabilities in Relying on the Mass Beach Tourist
The previous subsection outlined the major ways that Sharm el Sheikh’s features
align with the model of the dependent resort. These were the enclave design, fordist
development, homogenization of the space and ecological damage. The last major
similarity between our case and other destinations in the global south lies in the
inherently unequal power dynamic between countries of origin and the destination. This
chapter has focused on economic development of the tourism space, the next will cover
social dynamics in the South Sinai and the final chapter examines political vulnerabilities
in the created space. The following conclusions regarding power dynamics are limited to
the economics of development, as the political and security factors will be examined in
‘Political Instability and Managing Tourism: Creation and Compromise of the New
Tourism Space’.
The Mubarak regime sought to design and develop South Sinai resorts as a means
of economic stability, although the target market of mass beach tourism held potential
weaknesses. The resort was designed based on a resort enclave model: based on the needs
of the European tourist, removed from the surrounding environment and easily
substitutable with other resorts around the world. Largescale tourism and a lack of
planning has created environmental damage to the area, which degrades the quality of
vacations and leads to lowered pricing for the space. Oversupply of tourism facilities has
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emerged within Sharm el Sheikh, leading to increased competition among hoteliers. The
lowered pricing to gain business has brought lower income tourists and has negatively
impacted the reputation of the resort. These economic conditions within Sharm el Sheikh
reflect the stagnation phase of Butler’s Tourism Area Life Cycle, which is the critical
point before potential decline. The irony in this development is that government policies
have created this vulnerability to natural decline, according to Butler’s model. The
specific targeting of European mass beach tourism has accelerated the potential for
decline while laying the foundation for another expression of inequality in power
between Egypt and tourist countries of origin.
One feature of the dependency model of tourism area development which
particularly speaks to the present moment in Sharm el Sheikh is the potential for sharp
decline of tourism in the case of political instability or the general perception of the area
being unsafe for travel. The heavy reliance on first world patronage is extremely apparent
with this example. Global south destinations face heavy decline and potential collapse
based on the perception of risk by the first worlds’ gaze. When a country is deemed
unsafe for travel, first world countries circulate this notion and can virtually destroy the
tourism industry within the destination. This final feature of dependence fits our case
study of Sharm el Sheikh. When faced with terrorism, the area was no longer a desirable
place to visit in relation to other, safer and similar locations. The standardization and lack
of diversification within the industry of the city contributed to the interchangeable nature
of the destination and its ultimate decline. As Sharm el Sheikh gained most of its income
and visitors through this form of tourism, it was a devastating blow to the city when mass
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tourism packages halted. The political and security challenges related to this decline will
be further expanded upon in the final chapter.
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3. EXCLUSION AND ALIENATION OF THE SOUTH SINAI BEDOUIN

While the Mubarak Regime planned to diversify the national tourism sector
through the development of the South Sinai, planning for this development ignored the
Bedouin community located on the peninsula. As development intensified and mainland
Egyptian investors increased their wealth, the poverty increased in the Bedouin
community. The progressive impoverishment of the Bedouin was due to the dual forces
of coercive sedentarization and exclusion from the economic benefits of increased
tourism. The Bedouin were effectively excluded from the planning and development
process of tourism spaces and facilities, which impacted their lifestyle, livelihoods, local
environment, and ultimately, their identity.
The contestation of the Sinai Peninsula ended in 1982, when Egypt’s peace treaty
with Israel mandated the complete turnover of the space to Egyptian authorities following
15 years of Israeli occupation. The Camp David Accords mandated that Egypt limit its
security forces in the territory, which hindered the state’s ability to fully incorporate the
peninsula.170 Despite this initial security limitation, an economic analysis of the space
commenced, with the goal of ascertaining opportunities presented by the newly
reacquired territory. The South Sinai was inhabited by several varied Bedouin tribes,
which had historical roots to the space for well before the Islamic period, with current
estimates of the population totaling 40,000 people organized into eight tribes.171 These
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tribes have varied means of livelihoods, lifestyles and social organizations and have been
challenged by varied state economic policies.
Among the tribes affected by tourism development in the Sinai are the Mzeina, Al
Tarabin and Jebeliya, who have all had unique economic histories dependent on their
inhabited territory. Distinctive effects on these communities were produced by the
different state-led development strategies. The Saint Katherine Monastery and
surrounding area represent one attempt at the creation of a national protection area, while
Sharm El Sheikh exemplifies a resort enclave characterized by exclusion. Dahab’s slow
pace of development has created a reluctant inclusion of Bedouin on the periphery of the
tourism space, although the state seeks to further marginalize their informal tourism
activities. The development policies pursued by the government has presented distinctive
challenges in economic exclusion and growing dependence on tourism within the South
Sinai Bedouin communities.
This chapter examines the economic and social changes within the Bedouin tribes
inhabiting the South Sinai. It begins with highlighting the relationship of the Bedouin to
the land and the government policies which formally removed their rights to ownership.
The next section, ‘Altered Bedouin Livelihoods’ illuminates the economic changes
resulting from the changed relationship between the Bedouin and their land. The next
portion looks at the failed attempt of the Egyptian government to incorporate the Bedouin
in the tourism space surrounding the Saint Katherine Monastery. This chapter concludes
with a discussion of the inherent problems of the exclusion of the Bedouin from
participating in the newly created tourism space and sets up the final chapter on the
deteriorating security situation in the Sinai Peninsula.
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3.1 Divorced from the Local Environment
The central dominating force for Bedouin life is the land. With their highly
specific knowledge of flora and fauna, seasonal weather patterns and the delicate balance
of resources in the territory, the Bedouin lifestyle was built upon the use and maintenance
of this space. While attempting to avoid essentializing or romanticizing the community, it
is imperative to understand the communities’ conceptualization of land use and
ownership.
The relationship between the Bedouin and the land has been historically
dominated by customary law. Inter-tribal agreements segmented the land between
‘developed’ and common property. Land used for grazing and the coastline were
considered public or common land, as they were indispensable to the tribes because of
pastoral activities.172 Tribes along the coast did not cultivate the land, which maintained
the space for community use, people were allowed to move through spaces inhabited by
other tribes.173 The Mzeina tribe historically lived on the coast between Sharm El Sheikh
and the city of Dahab, however other tribes were allowed access to the sea.174
Ethnographic studies of the Bedu tribes show a cultural emphasis on material equality,
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which has been produced by the impermanence of wealth gained through pastoralism and
a common use of land and resources.175
Under occupation, the Israeli Nature Preserves Authority proclaimed that 98% of
the South Sinai coast was a protected land preserve.176 This protection had a dual effect:
it limited physical development of the land by the authorities and controlled the building
on the land by local Bedouin. The Israeli government constructed one major roadway
along the coastline in 1972, and two semi-cooperative farms with adjoining small holiday
villages.177 The tourism developments built by the Israeli occupiers were limited to a
township at Sharm el Sheikh, a low-scale resort area near the township and one large
luxury hotel at Taba.178 The mandate of protection curbed largescale physical changes to
the land, however this decree effectively hampered local Bedouin construction. During
this time, no Bedouin was allowed to undertake new construction of buildings other than
wooden shacks despite their traditional use of seasonal homes on the coast which were
better constructed.179 This limitation on building by the Bedouin would later obstruct
their claims to ownership of the land when Israel turned control of the space over to
Egyptian Authorities.
According to the traditions of the Mzeina tribe, there were three main ways a
family could stake their claim to a piece of land. The planting of fruit trees was one major
signifier of land claim. Second, the building of a permanent dwelling is one mark of
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development, which separates itself from the construction of palm huts which through
customary law could be constructed on any piece of land whether claimed or
unclaimed.180 The third method of displaying to the community the claims over a piece of
land was the construction of a well.181 Although these spatial identifiers signaled to others
the ‘ownership’ of the land within the Mzeina tribe, land has been considered corporate:
the tribes have a right to all land use as long as the land remains undestroyed.182
The demarcation of land for common use was essential to the economic structures
of the Bedu lifestyle. The lack of largescale tourism development or urbanization of the
South Sinai under Israeli administration did not prepare the Bedouin for the rapid
changes awaiting the territory under the Egyptian state project. While the Israelis
attempted to prevent major changes to the land, while recognizing the inherent claims of
the Bedouin, the Egyptian policies viewed the land as free and subject to the economic
needs of the state. The major force in the nationalization of the land by the Egyptian state
occurred with Law 143 of 1981, which placed the entire peninsula under the ownership
of the state, with the implication that the land could be used, leased or sold to any other
interested party.183 This legal nationalization fundamentally altered the Bedouin
relationship to the land, formally moving its governance away from tribal affiliations and
Bedouin customary law.184 The state attempted to partially honor the moral claim of the
Bedouins through a forced division of the land, which was formally collectively used
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through pastoral migration. This political attempt discriminated against the local
community by forcing families to lay claim to one plot of land, which was required to be
registered with local authorities through the payment of a onetime fee.185 This fee was
often too expensive for most Bedouins to pay, and in the case of especially desirable
land, the state chose to ignore the choices of the locals and instead sold the land to
Egyptian investors.186
In the effort to secure government deeds to land not marked for tourism
investment, some families scrambled to lay permanent cinder block homes or beach
cafes, although these efforts were often met with the government bulldozing the
unauthorized structures.187 The desperate attempts to claim land rights led to a cyclical
process where Bedouin claimed land, sold it cheaply out of fear of confiscation, and then
settled on the outskirts of tourist areas where they tried to reclaim ‘state-owned’ lands.188
This fear of confiscation drove the Bedouin to sell their claimed plots for only 35-50 EGP
per square meter.189
The coastal areas were of particular interest to Egyptian authorities who saw the
unique opportunity to develop enclave-style tourist resorts on the sea. After the economic
assessment of the peninsula, the seaside areas were declared strictly for tourism use under
the Ministry of Tourism in 1988 through Prime Ministerial decree no 993.190 Two years
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later, under Law no 7, the Tourism Development Authority was established with the
mandate to consolidate tourism planning and building activities; this change divided the
coast into development sectors and commenced both the beginning of tourism
infrastructure building by the state and the auction of the land to private investors.191 This
law allowed the state’s plan of tourism development to begin promptly, while effectively
disenfranchising tribes who relied on access to the coast. In the effort to physically
remove Bedouins from the most highly appraised areas, the government offered land in
the interior of the peninsula for permanent settlement: 200 square meters of desert land in
exchange for moving off of the coastline.192
The acquisition of the Sinai by the Egyptian State ushered in the current period
with a swift dispossession of the land for the Bedouin tribes. The fundamental difference
in the conceptualization of land ownership was evident with these changes: the most
essential land could not be possessed by a single tribe or family according to customary
law, the Egyptian state viewed the land as subject to its economic needs. This change
relegated the tribes to certain portions of the space, which impaired their ability to
maintain the economic activities underpinning their nomadic lifestyle. The
sedentarization of the Bedouin, caused by the new limitations of space, altered the
economic activities of the population.
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3.2 Altered Bedouin Livelihoods
As state development projects commenced on the coast of the South Sinai, the
Bedouin were forced to the margins of these new tourist spaces. Increasing urbanization
and construction of tourist facilities limited the former economic endeavors of the
Bedouin tribes. While the Sinai Development Plan emphasized the areas growing
employment opportunities for mainland low-skilled young Egyptians in the developing
tourism industry, the Bedouins were largely excluded from formal jobs. Along with the
decreasing access to resources needed to sustain their economic way of life, the Bedouin
were relegated to informal, but highly limited, work in the tourism sector. The socioeconomic changes taking place within these communities are differentiated by the
tourism models presented by the Saint Katherine Protectorate, the resort city of Sharm El
Sheikh, and the town of Dahab.
Among the Jebeliya tribes inhabiting the mountains near the Saint Katherine
Monastery, the primary economic activities centered on herding and horticulture prior to
1967. Each family owned an average flock size of 50 goats and sheep, which were relied
upon for essential staples of milk, cheese, wool and hides.193 These tribes grew tobacco,
various vegetables and fruits, such as dates, apricots, apples and figs, along with wheat to
make bread.194 The coastal tribe of the Mzeina also heavily supplemented their diet and
income with fishing off of the coast, while the plains inhabited by the Tiyaha tribes
allowed them to keep larger herds of animals.195 One extinct practice noted by travelers
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to the Sinai in the late 19th and early 20th century was the production and trade of charcoal
for other goods and modest sums in Cairo.196 Additional means of gaining currency in the
early 19th century was the leveraging of protection money from the monastery and renting
caravan services to travelers moving through the territory.197
The economics of the Bedouin tribes before the changes implemented by the state
were already shifting under Israeli Occupation. Members of the Bedu began to make
money from the occupiers through wage labor to construct infrastructure in the area. This
change marked a distinct shift from semi-nomadic pastoralism, horticulture, hunting and
fishing.198 As the Bedu began to settle and accept paid work from the Israeli development
efforts, average flock size for each family reduced from 80 to 13 and higher elevation
orchards were typically abandoned.199 With the nationalization of the land by the
Egyptian state and the swift undertaking of tourism development, the economic
opportunities of the Bedouin in the area became limited to subsistence level informal
work.
Development of the Sinai under Egyptian rule has increased poverty and has
contributed to an extensive decline in the former livelihoods sustaining these tribes.
Increased poverty stems from forced sedentarization and a simultaneous limitation on
income generating activities with tourists. Several structural conditions contribute to the
changing livelihoods of these groups such as limited education, prejudice of employers in
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the position to provide secure work, limited access to tourism spaces and political
processes dominating tourism spaces.200 As mentioned above, the tribes along the coast
experienced divergent economic constraints because of the potential value of the land for
tourism development.
Under Israeli occupation, the Sharm El Sheikh area began developing in early
1972 as a town named Ophira.201 The population was relatively small in 1974, with about
400 Israelis involved in tourism and supporting military facilities with about 300 to 400
Bedouin.202 During this period, these Bedouin were living in a shantytown made of scrap
metals while attempting to secure employment opportunities offered by Israeli
developers.203 These Bedouin men had left their families among their tribes to pursue
these opportunities, but the Israeli administrators had future plans to construct permanent
housing for this population suitable for family life.204 Permanent housing for the Bedouin
were to be built by the Israeli state within the town of Ophira. Ophira was developing
faster than other locations in the final years before the Egyptian takeover of the space, as
the Israelis began building a major resort on Naama bay and began to improve the
facilities at the airport nearby.205 Although development of tourism facilities began
during Israeli occupation, the planning incorporated the Bedouin of the area, a stark
contrast to the development model implemented by the Egyptians. The Israelis sought to
formally employ the Bedouin, alongside the creation of adequate housing, evidenced by
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community training programs in lifesaving, restaurant service and construction.206 These
training programs were located in the burgeoning towns of Sharm el Sheikh and Dahab.
The actual development of Sharm el Sheikh and the current relationship of the
Bedouin to the tourism space has widely differed from the planning and nascent
programs offered under Israeli occupation. Bedu around the city of Sharm El Sheikh face
highly limited access to work with tourism and must settle outside the city proper, with
the tourism space itself contained by a wall which limits access and security checkpoints
on the roadways entering the city. Construction on this highly contested wall began in
2005 and symbolizes the final push to control the tourism space and limit the local
population’s access.207 In 2002, the one hundred hotels in this resort enclave were
estimated to have created between ten to thirty thousand direct jobs, which largely
excluded the Bedouin population; in informal activities such as events like desert safaris,
the work was strictly limited to Egyptian operators creating simulations of Bedouin life
outside of the resort.208 Limitations on informal employment have increased in the last
fifteen years, as the governor of Sharm el Sheikh began banning the Bedouin from
interacting with tourists in the form of offering camel rides, mountain treks and holding
tent parties at night.209
Opportunities in the town of Dahab are higher for the Bedouin, and although their
work is highly controlled, they have more interactions with the tourism in this area.
Dahab is a wholly different tourism space than the resort enclave of Sharm el Sheikh,
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which positively impacts the ability for Bedouin to maintain a presence in this town. This
town has been the center for low budget tourism for backpackers, originally young
Israelis, but now caters to domestic tourism and other foreign nationalities. While Dahab
currently remains a low budget and laid-back destination, the state plans to incorporate
Dahab into the Egyptian Riviera planning- seeking to build five-star resorts and turning
this tourism space into one which mirrors Sharm el Sheikh. This different form of
tourism space allows for the Mzeina Bedouin to interact with tourism and in some cases
maintain their own tourism based small businesses.
For the Mzeina settled around the Dahab tourism space, this interaction has
fundamentally changed their internal social hierarchy and their yearly migration patterns.
They began to migrate to Dahab during the Israeli administration to pursue opportunities
offered by tourism, but these opportunities created disparate degrees of family wealth for
the Bedu. Income activities related to tourism varied: selling land, owning coffee shops,
or driving taxis, leading desert treks and selling drugs to foreigners.210 These formal and
informal opportunities slowly began to form the basis of their economy, rather than
subsidy, fundamentally changing their desire and need to engage in nomadic migration
patterns or former income generating activities.211
The increasing presence of international visitors to Dahab, has produced a change
in the types of souvenirs and goods sold by the Bedouin settled in the space. Moving
from selling cotton pants and pitta bread to Israeli soldiers to producing goods aimed at
the desires of young backpackers, the youth around Dahab now create different goods.
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Tye-dye shirts and woven friendship bracelets have replaced the traditional Bedouin arts
of beadwork and carpet weaving, which are time consuming and lack demand in the
tourism market.212
Bedouin beachfront establishments in this town have increasingly changed into
Egyptian-owned businesses since the 1970s.213 Since the rapid development phase of the
late 1990s, the Egyptian authorities perceived the Bedouin run informal camps as a
hindrance to formal development and tolerance for the spaces changed.214 In the face of
changing official policy, a consultant for the Tourism Development Authority attempted
to aid the local Bedouin in adequately complying with government regulations regarding
these camps.215 By the year 2000, the pace of tourism development and the resulting
outside interest in the potential of the coastline outmatched the economic interests of the
Bedouin. This led to forceful removal of camps and cafes owned by Bedouin by the
Tourism Development Authority using Egyptian soldiers.216 The government excused the
actions through citing code violations, however, the space was technically marked for
formal hotel development. The changing face of Dahab, a move from Bedouin ownership
to Egyptian illuminates the tension at play: while the settled Bedouin of the area
increasingly rely on tourism to sustain themselves, they are systematically
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disenfranchised in favor of formal development projects and transplanted ownership of
the few businesses in the town.

3.3 Failure of ‘Sustainable’ Tourism Initiatives
One tourism space which stands apart from the experiences faced by Bedouin in
Dahab and Sharm el Sheikh is that of the Jelebiyya surrounding the St. Katherine
monastery. This tourism space is differentiated in the protected status of the area, which
attempted to preserve the land, causing a unique experience for the tribe. Although this
protected status in practice has changed significantly since its inception, the experience of
the land and the Bedouin necessitate examination.
The designation of the St. Katherine Protectorate represents an acknowledgement
by the state that tourism development presents potential harms to the environment. This
acknowledgement came under pressure by local conservation scientists and international
environmental organizations.217 The government under Mubarak classified almost forty
percent of the South Sinai as different protected areas.218 These protected areas, when
created in 1996, were conceptualized as sustainable development initiatives which could
offer alternative means of livelihood and originally involved the Bedu in their
planning.219 Although this policy committed to create development while providing for
the local community, the pace of development left the intent of the initiative behind.
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Upon the inception of the St. Katherine Protected area, the conservation efforts
were backed by a seven year development programme funded by the EU’s aid program at
7.5 million Euros.220 Although funded by outside the state, the area was under the official
management of the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, but control was
decentralized to the Protectorate’s administration working under the South Sinai’s
Governorate.221 This decentralized control weakened the capacity for conservation of the
protectorate’s administration. Funding by the EU in the beginning stages allowed for the
consultation and employment of the Bedouin, while social services for the group were
evaluated and delivered.222 By the early 2000s, a majority of the St Katherine
Protectorate employees were from the Bedouin and the organization had set up a
veterinary clinic, mobile health services and created a co-owned eco-lodge with 27
Bedouin families participating in the ownership.223 With the vision of empowering the
local community, the EU also helped establish a handicraft collective employing 300
women.224 This respectful and mutually beneficial relationship between the local Bedouin
and the administration of the Protectorate degraded with the ceased external funding,
which deteriorated the services provided to the group.225
Gilbert argues that the community relations of the space weakened through the
replacement of development discourse: external conceptualizations recognized the
knowledge and rights of indigenous populations, while the state inherently viewed the
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population as a burden and sought to change their lifestyle to fit the necessities of the
state’s tourism project.226 This shift in perspective on the population is evidenced in the
protectorate’s project of attempting to ‘re-educate’ the Bedouin on environmental
protection. The protectorate also claims that the population over-grazes the area,
essentially inferring that the practices of this community are destructive.227
The preservation of the land around the St. Katherine monastery has been
severely compromised by the building of tourism facilities around the site and the
construction of infrastructure to support other tourism projects. The tourism facilities
around the monastery now include stucco apartments, a pharaonic gatehouse and bus
facilities.228 This creation of the tourist space stands apart from the original buildings of
the Bedouin, which were few stone houses built into the mountain side.229 Among the
disfigurements of the land is a landfill built to support Sharm el Sheikh, a roadway
through the heavily relied upon wadi next to the site, and the construction of a railway up
Mount Sinai itself.230

3.4 Shifting identities and Increased Resistance to the State
Several tensions have become inherent to the interactions of development, state
policy and conceptualization of the indigenous community of the South Sinai. These
tensions stem from both categorization of the Bedu by state policy and self-
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conceptualization of the community in relation to the nation state. The rapid development
of tourism in the territory, along with the exclusionary policies of the state, have hindered
any fostering of Egyptian nationalism within the community while promoting the
perception of the Bedouin as outside the realms of citizenship within the state. The
tensions emerging from this relationship have contributed to the alienation of the
community and their rising resistance to the Egyptian state
Bedouin conceptualization of their self and relationship to outsiders began to
change with the beginnings of tourism under the Israeli occupation. Tourist stereotypes of
Bedouin life and culture, as promoted by guides, challenged the self-categorization of the
Bedu.231 As Bedouin life was represented artificially to outsiders, the community
recognized their move away from the stereotype presented. Folk narratives described a
lifestyle withering away with the increase in financial opportunities in tourism, further
challenging the notions of what it meant to be Bedouin.232 While the identity of the
Bedouin was challenged with the burgeoning tourism industry under the Israelis,
structural impediments to the maintenance of their nomadic lifestyle under the Egyptian
state challenged their identity and fostered alienation from mainland Egypt. Tourism
development in the South Sinai has fundamentally changed the Bedouins relationship to
the land, their means of economic sustenance and ultimately their self-conceptualization.
These social changes, forced from development policies outside of their community, bred
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resentment through both exclusion from planning and heightened competition for the few
economic opportunities in the form of economic migration from mainland Egypt.
The forceful divorce of the Bedouin from the land in the South Sinai remains a
wound felt deeply due to their cultural conceptualization of nature itself. ‘The
environment’ housing the Bedouin is often called simply ‘life’. This linguistic category
illuminates that for the Bedouin, there is no separation between themselves and their
environment, that the collective system within which they live is their life.233 The
Bedouin take what they need from their local environment and do not see themselves as
separate or above their land. The tribes regard themselves as part of an interdependent
cycle as evidenced by both their entitlement and responsibility towards natural
resources.234 The Bedouin view of nature is fundamentally different than the ‘modern’
conceptualization of the environment by the state: the difference between viewing the
environment as an interdependent system, versus as an object to generate material
gains.235 This fundamentally different view of the environment has produced a policy
towards the coast of bending the natural environment to the needs of tourism
development, while divorcing the Bedouin from their interdependent system of
livelihood.
Removal from the land has fundamentally threatened the Bedouin system of
livelihood. Before the carving of the land for tourism development, a diverse economic
system allowed for the Bedouin to live off the land in various ways through herding,
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fishing, planting crops, all based on seasonal migration. With the cutting off of the coast
and the forced settlement in many cases of this population, the means of livelihood has
inevitably changed and become highly dependent on access to paid work which allows
for families to sustain themselves throughout the year. This reliance on paid work is
complicated by the competition for employment from economic migration stemming
from Mainland Egypt.
This removal from their environmental system has created a sense of inherent
responsibility within the Bedouin community of fierce protection of the land against the
encroachment of a disregarding developmental process. This removal speaks to the
reinvented identity within the Bedouin community, as the community foremost identifies
itself with the natural world and the pre-development livelihoods which are now
limited.236 This reconstitution of identity is challenged by outsider encroachment on
Bedouin land, as it stands as a fundamental undercutting of a cherished aspect of selfidentity. Growing feelings of the necessity of guarding nature against the state is one
form of resistance practiced by the Bedu.237 This places the Bedouin community in
contention with the state mandated authorities formally charged with protecting the land,
further alienating the Bedouin community from the state which attempts to ‘modernize’
them.238 Furthermore, state narratives of the Bedouin further remove them from the
perceived ability to ‘protect’ the land. This contentious relationship between the state
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authorities and the Bedu dominates the current alienation experienced around the St.
Katherine Protectorate.
Formally the protectorate is mandated with environmental protection, stemming
from the assumption that Bedouin activities damage the environment.239 The control of
Bedouin is a more achievable goal than countering tourism development projects; so the
protectorate focuses on ‘adjustments in patterns of Bedouin resource use’.240 The state
narrative claims that Bedouin ‘overgrazing’ causes serious declines in vegetation
threatening the biodiversity of the area.241 This perception insists that the uneducated
Bedouin do not engage in real conservation and do not understand the balance necessary
to protect the biodiversity of the area.242 The perpetrated stereotype feeds the states selfimposed mandate of protection and the idea that the Bedouin must be modernized
through education concerning their own land. The activities of the Mainland Egyptians in
the territory, have created distrust over the idea of protection.
The policies of tourism development from the Egyptian state has further
entrenched the ethnic cleavages present between mainland Egypt and Sinai Bedouin. The
connections between nationality, citizenship and the land in the Sinai under Egypt create
the tension between being a ‘national’ and being a ‘citizen’, both categories are a
requirement to land rights.243 Early in the modern state project, Egyptian officials labels
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the Bedu as inhabitants of the Sinai, excluding them from the category of citizen, while
their government issued paperwork formally limited their movements.244 Formal
citizenship, and the rights inherent, are demarcated by the state and necessarily impact
the formally created right to land ownership.245 They have created a highly negative view
of Egyptian state and society among the Bedouin population.
Development in the South Sinai, and the increasing ‘modernizing’ force this
process creates has brought increasing access to material goods which changes the
identity of the Bedu. The changing identity of these groups is doubly affected by better
access to material goods through an internal assessment of people as modern or primitive,
while the acquisition of modern goods makes people consider themselves and others as
less Bedu.246 This is a process of dispossession: access to modernity forces the Bedu to
leave their indigenous notions of prosperity.247 This diversion between bedu norms and
the emergence of consumerism and individualism has eroded community cohesion,
where once generosity and communal resource sharing dominated.248
The policy choices by the Egyptian government in their pursuit of tourism
development have created higher alienation of the Bedouin in the South Sinai. This has
led to a significant vulnerability within the territory due to the perceptions among the
population of an outsider who encroaches on their land, destroying this highly valued
source of life. While the Egyptian government sought to improve state economics
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through this development, it failed to consult and incorporate the local community,
removing them from the benefits and successes of the newly built space and also
preventing any inherent feeling of responsibility to protect the growing tourism industry.
From the beginnings of acquiring the land, the government authorities have alienated the
local Bedouin and have sought to fully exclude them from the tourism rewards. This
method of exclusion represents a distinct vulnerability of the tourism space through the
active creation of outsiders with no reason to work towards promoting and protecting this
new means of economic stability for the state.
This relationship between the outsiders and the local community fits within our
overarching discourse of dependency, although it is a narrative of the state creating a
space it can dominate and use for its own gains. The state seeks to modernize itself
through the building of the tourism industry, and requires the effective modernization of
the Bedu through forcing the community into the structural frameworks perpetrated by
the state. Through the modernizing forces of tourism development, it has effectively
excluded the local population while creating a relationship of dependency. The
destruction of the Bedouin lifestyle came about with the building of the tourism space,
obliging the population to support themselves with meager informal work on the
periphery of the tourism space. Mainland Egyptian elite gained a majority of the profits
and opportunities from the new tourism developments, while relegating the local
community to the least profitable endeavors. Furthermore the structural disadvantage of
the Bedouin in relation to the space has deepened social tensions with Mainland Egypt, as
the Bedouin recognize the destruction of their lifestyle along with their isolation from
gaining economic benefits from the industry. These factors have contributed to the
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deteriorating security conditions currently facing the Sinai Peninsula, which are discussed
thoroughly in the following chapter.
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4. POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND MANAGING TOURISM: CREATION AND
COMPROMISE OF THE NEW TOURISM SPACE

Linear development of the tourism industry necessitates political stability, which
presents a challenge to the Egyptian state. The development of tourism capabilities in the
South Sinai was an attempt by the Mubarak regime to grow the tourism sector away from
the violence destabilizing the sector in the 1990s. This tactic was initially successful: the
new tourism developments in the Sinai did not suffer from the effects of a negative image
transfer from the political violence occurring in mainland Egypt. Despite terrorists
targeting the new tourism developments in the early 2000s, the industry continued its
overall upward trend. Many disrupting forces have threatened this exponential growth,
however, the most deadly attack on tourists in Egypt’s history crippled the tourism
industry in the South Sinai. Although national tourism is currently experiencing an
upswing, it is unclear when tourism will reach previous numbers in the South Sinai.
In the effort to understand the relationship of political instability and tourism in
the South Sinai several components of this relationship necessitate examination. This
chapter seeks to outline how political violence shaped the tourism vision for the South
Sinai as a destination removed from the terrorism experienced in mainland Egypt. As
terrorists began to target the new tourism space, how did the industry react? As political
instability peaked with the Revolution, sparking a security vacuum in the peninsula, what
were the interactions of security forces, terrorist elements and the tourism industry?
Along with this assessment, the constraints on political control within the tourism
industry will be discussed, as external influences on the perceptions and choices of
tourists inevitably impacts the ability for the tourist space to recover. This chapter seeks
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to broadly discuss the vulnerabilities of the tourism industry in the face of political
instability, and in what ways policy choices have contributed to this growing
vulnerability in the sector.

4.1 Attempted Destabilization of the Regime: Terrorism and Tourism in the 1990s
Discontents towards the regime had little power to affect change during the
1990s, which led these actors to deploy methods of terrorism in their attempt to affect the
political climate. Simultaneously, the regime sought to establish economic stability in the
effort to maintain political dominance. As discussed within the economic section of this
study, one of the major methods to preserve itself when faced with externally mandated
structural adjustment was the attempt to grow tourism as a means to promote
employment, generate hard currency reserves, and maintain the balance of payments in
trade. Tourism was growing in the 1990s, despite setbacks sustained through terrorist
attacks. Diversification of the sector into sun/sand on the Red Sea and in the South Sinai
represented an important avenue to foster growth and to provide stability when mainland
tourism was challenged.
Terrorist actors have historically targeted tourism within Egypt due to the
government’s economic reliance on tourism as an important part of the GDP and a major
source of foreign currency. Politically, tourism has entrenched the regime by providing
these macroeconomic benefits and by perpetuating neo-patrimonial support through
selective privatization of the industry and the selling of facilities and land to domestic
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elites.249 These twin benefits to the regime has led to the targeting of this sector, while
socially, terrorist organizations have viewed the presence of foreigners as having a
negative impact on Egyptian culture through the introduction of western values.
The shift from specifically aiming at security targets to soft targets was a long
process of political exclusion of certain actors from state building and consolidation.
Following exclusion from the political process after the revolution of the 1950s,
marginalized Islamist groups have deployed acts of terror for various aims, with
increased intensity since the late 1970s.250 Beginning with inter-community violence,
terrorist actors moved to targeting the regime through attacks on police, riots and
assassination attempts during the era of Sadat.251 With the successful assassination of
Sadat by al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the newly appointed Mubarak regime quickly cracked
down on these groups through mass arrests and other forms of repression. Government
crackdown on Islamist organizations renewed their commitment to further harm the
regime in the late 1980s, contributing to a shift of focus to soft targets in the 1990s.252
Terrorism against tourists significantly impacted tourism indicators in the early to
mid-1990s, the impacts within the sector are illustrated in figure 2 below. Between
August 1992 and March 1995, 25 attacks against tourists occurred ranging from sniper
shootings at cruise ships, buses and trains and bombings of cafes and restaurants.253
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These frequent acts of terrorism contributed to lowered monthly arrivals of foreigners
between 1992 and 1995. This impacted revenues from tourism for three years, dropping
from 2.45 billion USD to 2.07 billion USD in 1993, with 1994 showing a further decline
to 2.04 billion USD.254
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Figure 2. Monthly Tourist Arrivals Jan 1990 - May 1998

Tourism indicators recovered significantly following this stagnation, as terrorist
attacks stalled and the government pursued heavy handed tactics including mass arrests,
increased control over mosques, mass trials, and increased political repression within the
formal party system.255 This recovery period, which provided a 43% increase in revenue
between 1995 and 1996, was significantly challenged by the Luxor massacre, where
shooters killed 70 tourists at the Temple of Hatshepsut.256 This massacre, representing the
largest killing of tourists to this point, impacted the tourism sector through slashing
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arrivals in half and creating a loss of over $200 million dollars. Figure 3 below
demonstrates the impact of this attack on monthly tourist arrivals.
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Figure 3.. Monthly Tourist Arrivals Jan 1997 - Dec 1999

The Luxor shooting was the largest attack in the mid to late 1990s, a component of a
broader movement of violence against the state by al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. The ultimate
goal was the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt through the fall of the secularized
regime of Mubarak.257 Challenging the legitimacy of the regime, terrorism against
tourists provided an exceptionally destabilizing impact economically through a decline in
foreign receipts, a disruption of the balance of payments within the national budget, and a
loss of revenue for the state. The impact of this political instability on yearly tourism
revenues is illustrated in figure 4 below. This instability created by terrorism prompted

257

Sinha, P.B. ‘Threat of Islamic Terrorism in Egypt’. Strategic Analysis 22(8) (1998): 1193-1213

109

the Mubarak regime to pursue alternative strategies in stabilizing tourism through the
creation of resorts in the South Sinai.

YEARLY TOURISM REVENUES:
1992 - 2000

BILLIONS

yearly tourism revenues
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Figure 4. Yearly Tourism Revenues 1992 - 2000

This act of terrorism surprised the Mubarak regime, who hoped that the previous
period of tranquility signified a weakened radical Islamist organization within the
country.258 The Interior Minister was fired for essentially allowing the attack through a
lack of security.259 The newly appointed Interior Minister vowed to tighten security to
prevent another similar attack, while Mubarak himself attempted to assure the
international community that this kind of attack could potentially occur anywhere in the
world.260 The government replaced its strategy of mass arrests and mass trials leading to
death penalty sentences, with an even tougher anti-terrorism campaign. Simultaneously,
the strategy for the tourism sector emphasized diversification through a focus on
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development of Red Sea resorts.261 The remote locations of these spaces and active
branding as being detached from the turmoil of central Egypt, led the burgeoning Red
Sea resorts to be immune to the national decline of 1997-1998.262 This immunity of the
new tourism spaces emboldened the regime to intensify the building of tourism capacities
in those spaces as a means to stabilize revenues within the national tourism sector. This
diversification into sand and sea based tourism, along with the intensive building of these
capacities, was a direct result of the violence focused on the heritage sites. While this
strategy provided stabilized tourism arrivals and revenues throughout the early 2000s,
terrorist actors met this success with a changed focus towards the newly profitably tourist
resorts.

4.2 Building Threat from the Unsecured Sinai
Conflict and contestation has characterized the history of the Sinai, while the local
population has never been adequately integrated into any state building process of its
occupiers. Israeli forces controlled the peninsula since the mid-1950s, except for a brief
takeover by Egypt. This inter-state conflict concluded with the 1979 peace treaty between
Egypt and Israel which negotiated demilitarization of the territory and a structured
withdrawal of Israeli forces over a three year period. Following this formal conclusion of
inter-state conflict, remnants of this contestation persist in the North and societal
cleavages have emerged from the failure of integration of the territory with mainland
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Egypt. Intra-state conflict now dominates the territory stemming from historical ties with
Palestine, political exclusion of the Bedouin, and government security policy; this
conflict escalated during the mid-2000s and has become protracted from cyclical
violence.
Intra-state conflict emerged from the historical exclusion of the essentially
stateless populations of the North: the Bedouin tribes and the former Palestinians. Tawhid
wa Jihad, an Islamist organization sourcing members from these disenfranchised
populations, pursued a campaign of violence against civilians in the South Sinai resorts
during the mid-2000s. Political reasons for these attacks point to the contentious nature of
politics near the crossing into Gaza, disenfranchisement and disconnection of the territory
with mainland Egypt, and the relationship of the poor Upper Sinai with the more wealthy
and better supported South Sinai (because of development of resorts and unequal access
to donor aid).263 Following a seven year stagnation in terrorist activity, a period of
cyclical political violence began with intensifying conflict: escalation of heavy handed
security tactics on the part of the state, increased capabilities of terrorist organizations
with renewed commitment to target tourism, and a widening socio-political disconnection
between the Sinai and Cairo.
The first major terrorist attack on tourists during this period was in Taba, a border
resort city between Israel and Egypt, where a car bombing in 2004 killed 34 vacationers
and wounded almost 160 others (mostly Egyptian and Israeli). 264 This attack occurred
following the Egyptian national holiday of 6th of October, an anniversary of the Egyptian
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Army’s crossing of the Suez in the 1973 war.265 The specific motivations for this
violence was thought to extend from the Palestinian conflict, due to the location of the
resort Taba, its popularity among Israeli vacationers, and date itself representing a point
of extreme pride for the Egyptian state.
This surprising attack left the state scrambling to understand who perpetrated this
attack. A severe crackdown in the North ensued, with the government mass arresting
3000 people and holding hostage women and children until suspects surrendered.266
These almost desperate mass arrests were followed by brutal torture in the effort to
extract information related to the terrorist attack.267 This crackdown and the close control
of the Northern Sinai by Egyptian security forces contributed to the strong desire of
Tawhid wa Jihad to retaliate.
The second attack occurred in Sharm El Sheikh, a city often used by then
President Mubarak for international summits, coincided with the anniversary of the 1952
Revolution.268 This retaliatory attack utilized three separate bombs to kill almost 70
vacationers, the vast majority being Egyptian.269 This attack was claimed by Tawhid wa
Jihad and was met with additional security crackdowns by the regime, with additional
mass arrests of suspects along with their neighbors and relatives.270 An additional
retaliation occurred against the Egyptian state in the resort town of Dahab during the
Egyptian holiday of Sham en-Nessim 2006, on the eve of the anniversary of Israel’s 1982
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withdrawal from the territory.271 This final large attack killed 19 and injured 90 mostly
Egyptian tourists.272 Following this third terrorist attack against the resorts in the South,
the Regime increased its harsh tactics of widespread arrests and torture in the effort to
disrupt terrorist networks in the Sinai.
The cluster of terrorist attacks in October 2004, July 2005 and April 2006 were a
new development in the tactics of Sinai based terrorist organizations. Previously focused
on small infrequent guerilla attacks on police and military installations in the North Sinai,
the resort bombings in this era represented an escalation in the abilities and aims of
Tawhid wa Jihad. These bombings coincided with Egyptian national holidays and were
designed to kill Egyptians.273 All of these attacks were obviously meant to target the
resort industry, to expose the government’s security failings, and to cause maximum
possible damage to the sector.274 Even though this series of bombings directly targeted
the tourism industry, the effects on tourism were short-lived and did not significantly
affect the overall tourism sector of the state. Figure 5 below displays the yearly tourism
revenues over the decade while figure 6 illustrates the trend in yearly tourist arrivals for
the decade.
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Figure 5. Yearly Tourism Revenues 2000 – 2010
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Figure 6. Yearly Tourist Arrivals 2000 - 2010

The short lived impact on the national tourism sector can be seen in the monthly
tourism arrivals, as evidenced in figure 7 below, but do not significantly impact the
yearly tourist arrivals. The yearly tourism revenues were also immune to impact, and as
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seen when looking at the trends of the overall decade, the September 11th attacks had a
larger effect than these terrorist attacks in the South Sinai. The negative consequences of
these attacks can be seen when looking at the slight interruption in foreign tourist arrivals
in the South Sinai, the number of yearly Egyptian tourists to the South Sinai, and the
disruption in the trends in hotel occupancy in the area. These trends are illustrated in
figures 8, 9, and 10 below. These trends indicated that these attacks had a localized
impact on tourism to the South Sinai, while not significantly affecting the overall sector.
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Figure 10. Percent of Hotel Occupancy 2000 - 2010

These terrorist attacks took the government by surprise as they represented a new
frontier for terrorist organizations in the Sinai. The targeting of the tourism industry in
the south was meant to create a sense of insecurity in the resorts, and was ultimately
designed to impact the economic benefits of the growing resort tourism during this
period. The targeting of Egyptians hurt domestic tourism in the region, as evidenced by
the decline in occupancy and the decline of Egyptian tourism during the 2003 – 2005
period. This decline did not translate to a decline in overall tourism in the state, as
revenues and yearly tourist arrivals increased over this period. When looking at South
Sinai tourism specifically, foreign tourist arrivals also increased during the 2002 – 2007
period.
These attacks were meant to send a message to the Mubarak regime through
weakening one of the state’s most profitable industries and the deliberate targeting of
Egyptian and Israeli tourists. However, dual processes occurred to further entrench this
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conflict and increase radicalization among the Bedouin populations in the North.
Politically, with every strike from terrorist organizations, the regime harshly responded
through mass arrests which placed Bedouins in prison with Salafists. This tactic created
the opportunity for radicalization within the historically disenfranchised population.275
The stagnating socio-economic circumstances of the Northern Bedouin tribes contributed
to the proliferation of smuggling networks and the blockade of Gaza in 2007 led to an
opportunistic demand for goods for Hamas.276 This interdependence with Hamas gave the
Northern Bedouins an economic lifeline through underground smuggling and furthered
the ideological influence of Hamas within the North Sinai.277
Following the security tactics deployed by the central government, terrorism
targeting tourism declined. This development stemmed from the waves of mass arrests of
suspects along with their families in the North and the heightened security presence. This
temporary lull in terrorist activities targeting tourism continued until political instability
in Cairo led to decreased ability for the central government to remain in control of the
Northern Sinai.

4.3 Political Instability, Escalated Violence, and Lawlessness in the Sinai
A highly complex security threat has emerged within the Sinai, due to several
internal and regional challenges. Regionally, the increased cooperation between the
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Bedouin and Hamas in Gaza has led to the exchange of ideas and weapons, along with
providing the Northern Bedouin tribes with a much needed economic lifeline in the form
of smuggling. The increased movement between the borders through the underground
tunnels have brought Hamas and other resistance fighters into the Sinai, which has been
exacerbated by the decreased Egyptian security presence. Political instability in Cairo
created an opportunity for resistance for the northern Bedouin tribes. The security
vacuum created by the decreased security presence has created escalating cyclical
violence, increased presence of terrorist organizations and higher technical capabilities
for these groups.
The escalation of terrorism in the Sinai with the intensified government tactics to
dispel these organizations has led to a protracted conflict in the north. Retaliation
characterizes this conflict with guerilla tactics seeking harm to the central government
and violent, widespread counter-insurgency measures perpetrated by the military. The fall
of the Mubarak regime sparked resistance tactics as central security forces and police had
largely withdrawn from their postings in the Sinai.278 This development was viewed as
potentially short-lived, leading many northern Bedouin to begin to stockpile available
weapons.279 Simultaneously, militants began attacking the trans-Sinai natural gas
pipeline, a lingering symbol of the corruption of the fallen Mubarak regime, and
attacking border guards and the few police remaining at their stations. 280 The insurgents
claimed to specifically target Israel and sought to further erode central state control
through attacks on security forces, infrastructure and border guards.281The increasing
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guerilla style tactics pursued by elements in the Sinai led the central government to
respond with a large-scale deployment of troops with the permission of the Israeli
government.
The first major military campaign against separatism occurred in August 2011,
with the deployment of 1000 members of the military into the North Sinai.282 This
offensive gave the central government a legitimizing reason to re-establish emergency
law nationally. This offensive named Desert Eagle and its renewal, Operation Sinai in
2012, was the largest deployment of troops and heavy weaponry into the territory since
the Camp David Accords.283 With a severe lack of human intelligence on the ground,
these offensives took the form of active engagement with militants within the civilian
population.284 Although these operations scared the insurgents out of the main cities in
the North, they regained organizational strength while in hiding and attacked border
guards on two separate occasions, despite increased security presence.285
The elections in Egypt brought new national leadership who attempted to alter the
approach to security in the Sinai, although the abilities of the leadership were limited in
the face of political power of the military leadership. Morsi sought to use diplomacy as a
first response to guerilla tactics of terrorist cells, in the form of negotiation and mediation
with tribal chiefs in the northern Sinai.286 Morsi sought the input of these tribes in
instilling peace in the peninsula, while militants and arms continued to flow into the Sinai
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and underground into Gaza. Challenging the strategy for peace, more soldiers and police
were killed or abducted under Morsi leadership.287 These developments ultimately
widened the gulf between the Morsi regime and the senior military leadership within
Egypt.
While the Morsi government sought a softer approach, the coup in mid-2013
changed security policy towards the territory which intensified the conflict. Alongside the
stark change in security policy, the removal of the Morsi government angered insurgents
and attacks on security forces increased in frequency in the months following.288 Higher
frequency of terrorist attacks and growing extremism was met with strong government
crackdown on Islamists following the consolidation of power by the al-Sisi Regime.289
The government sought to control the area through an approach of eradication, while
militant attacks on security forces became frequent and more sophisticated.290 The al-Sisi
government responded to the more lethal and sophisticated attacks on security forces with
a brutal campaign of violence within the North Sinai characterized by largescale
bombings and the displacement of the local population. The heavy handed military
operations have included media blackouts and widespread curfews since 2013.291
Among the many terrorist organizations in the territory, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, a
Salafi jihadi organization originally focused on attacking Israeli targets, has emerged as
significant threat to the Egyptian state. The group emerged in 2011, although it stems
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from connections with Tawhid wa Jihad, the group responsible for the earlier attacks on
the tourism industry in the South Sinai resorts.292 This organization turned its focus to the
Egyptian State in 2013 in the form of attacks on the police and military, and has
expanded their capacity to target civilians in Cairo and the South Sinai.293 This
organization pledged their allegiance to the Islamic State in November 2014.294 With the
allegiance to the Islamic State, attacks on government forces became larger in scale and
more complex which indicated a true cooperation with IS leadership and the acquisition
of more advanced weapons.295
The former Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, now named Wilayat Sinai (Sinai State), has
sought to create a sense of instability within the territory through guerrilla and insurgent
style attacks, aided by the local Bedouin. Focused on undermining central government’s
authority, Wilayat Sinai has effectively exploited the longstanding cleavages between the
local population and Cairo.296 As the focus has shifted from the state to civilian targets,
the capabilities of the organization have also grown. The bombing of Metrojet flight
9268, claimed by Wilayat Sinai, indicated a change in the abilities of the organization,
increased access to more sophisticated weapons, and enhanced political ambitions.297
The tragic bombing of Metrojet flight 9268 represented a major blow to Egyptian
tourism and economic stability, while representing a definite shift in political aims of
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Wilayat Sinai. The targeting of a Russian flight, with almost all 224 victims of Russian
nationality, indicated the ability to affect international politics in line with the ambitions
of the global Islamic State movement.298 The organization stated that this attack was in
retaliation for Russian airstrikes in Syria and Moscow’s alliance with Syria.299 Alongside
the international message regarding Syria, this act of terrorism was the largest against
tourists in Egypt’s history and has had an unprecedented impact on the national tourism
sector.
Following this tragedy, the al-Sisi regime drastically increased their offensive
efforts against militants in the North Sinai, escalating the cyclical violence in the
territory. Attacks perpetrated by militants were over 357 incidents in 2015, and counter
terrorism efforts resulted in 3000 deaths in 2015 alone.300 Matching the number of
fatalities, detentions had also substantially increased to 3,600 in 2015.301 Along with the
detentions and fatalities, the army’s tactics included the destruction of tunnels connecting
the Gaza Strip and the North Sinai and sought to drive the population into militarycontrolled areas through displacement caused by attacking residential areas.302
These tactics to eradicate militant strongholds in the North and exert control over
the population have continued until the recent Sinai 2018 campaign. This newest
offensive has focused on villages and suburbs of cities in the north, El-Arish, Sheikh
Zuwayyed and Rafah, which has further displaced the civilian population.303 This
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development comes after years of mass detention and torture, bombardment of civilian
areas and bombings of militant strongholds in the north Sinai since the beginning of the
al-Sisi administration. This military based strategy has sought to weaken the radical
elements embedded in the governorate, but the fight for control of the North Sinai
continues.

4.4 Destination Management with Limited Control
While the al-Sisi regime attempts to stabilize the Northern Sinai, in the interest of
creating a secure environment for tourism recovery in the South, challenges remain. The
tourism industry in Egypt is highly susceptible to political instability, emerging both
internally and externally. The neighborhood effect has impacted tourism, especially in the
escalation of violence in Gaza, and domestic acts of terrorism against the industry have
caused fluctuations. The tourism sector has been in decline with the advent of political
insecurity caused by the revolution in early 2011, with significant challenges to the
industry occurring continuously until the tragedy of the Metrojet flight 9268 crash. The
crash highlighted the highly limited control the state has over three major components of
the tourism industry: the security of the space, the demand for tourism, and the perception
of instability within the destination.
This attack occurred in a highly vulnerable environment for national tourism in
Egypt. Since the Revolution in 2011, the industry has suffered significant decline. The
revolution immediately impacted the sector with a loss of 5 million tourist arrivals and a
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billion dollars in revenue over 2011.304 These trends are displayed in figures 11 and 12
below. This was the beginning of a decline over a six year period, with revenues steadily
dropping from 11 billion dollars in 2010 to only 4 billion dollars in 2016.305 Tourist
arrivals showed a loss to 9 million arrivals in 2011, increasing back to 11 million in 2012
before declining to 9 million until its lowest point in 2016 with 5 million tourist
arrivals.306 The specific impact of the Metrojet bombing is illustrated in monthly tourism
arrivals in figure 13 below. The anomaly of the temporary increase in arrivals can be
attributed to a slight recovery in the industry before the further decline following the
ouster of Morsi. The heavy losses within the tourism industry demonstrate the combined
effect of political instability and terrorist violence on the tourism sector.
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Long term political instability negatively impacts a country’s tourism industry
more than single incidents of terrorist violence. 307 Where Egypt’s tourism historically
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rapidly declines following terrorist violence, a full recovery commences after six
months.308 This was historically due to heritage tourism providing the foundation of the
industry prior to the Luxor Massacre. Heritage tourism is unique, which discourages
tourists from engaging in destination substitution.309 In long term political instability,
cyclical violence between the government and terrorist organizations push potential
tourists to choose other holiday destinations deemed safer.310 This finding is especially
true for European travelers who show particular sensitivity to Egyptian government
crackdown on Islamist opposition.311 Ongoing perception of high political risk
significantly erodes tourism arrivals and revenues.312 These findings work together to
explain the persistent difficulty of tourism recovery following the fall of the Mubarak
Regime. Rapid political changes, violence against opposition parties, escalating terrorist
attacks with reprisals from the state, and the largest terrorist attack against tourists in
Egypt’s recent history have combined to cripple the national and regional tourist
industries. This is complicated by the highly substitutable nature of Sharm el Sheikh as a
resort enclave: when faced with political violence and insecurity, tourists travel to
alternate destinations.
The fallout from the Metrojet crash has severely impacted the tourism sector in
the South Sinai, especially in the city of Sharm El Sheikh. This region accounted for
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almost 30% of the national tourism industry in 2014, with about 2.8 million tourist
arrivals, and its visitors were overwhelmingly Russian and European.313 However after
this tragedy Russian arrivals dropped from 3 million (32% of national foreign arrivals in
2014) to 54,000 by 2016- representing a loss of 98%.314 This change is illustrated in
figure 14 below. And other tourism arrivals from European countries also significantly
dropped to their lowest points following this tragedy: losing 84% of British visitors from
2010, 88% of German tourists, and 88% of Italian visitors.315 This downward trend since
the onset of political instability is displayed in figure 15 below. Within Sharm el Sheikh
itself, out of 216 hotels in the city, 100 closed or moved to other locations on the Red Sea
within 2016.316 In 2015, the city sustained an 8% decrease in occupancy and in 2016,
occupancy within hotels dropped an additional 43%.317 Overall tourism into the city
declined by 70% over 2015 – 2016.318 Egyptian officials have estimated that the damage
to the tourism industry within Sharm el Sheikh stands at 10 billion Le or about $566
million USD.319
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The significant impact of the insurgency in the Sinai on the tourism sector has
been a major challenge to the Egyptian state. The cyclical violence occurring in the Sinai
also poses a unique challenge to tourism, as securing the territory will aid in restoring the
confidence in tourists but the heavy handed tactics and retaliatory attacks also encourage
tourists to choose alternate destinations in the interim. In the immediate weeks and
months following the Metrojet disaster, the al-Sisi regime sought to both physically
secure the new tourism space while attempting to assure foreign governments of safety
measures for tourists. Both of these attempts were necessary to quell further negative
impacts on the tourism sector (and broader national economy) due to the unequal nature
of the relationship between the destination and the countries of origin of tourists.
The security of the new tourism space was an immediate priority for the al-Sisi
government. The central government escalated their offensive strategy against separatist
and radical militants embedded in the North Sinai. This strategy has been heavy handed
in the detention and torture of suspects, the bombing of militant strongholds, and has
sought to exert control over the local population through displacement. Within the
tourism space itself, the security measures were heightened substantially. While the
government already highly controlled Sharm El Sheikh, through the building of an
external wall in 2006, checkpoints were strengthened on the single road going into and
out of the city. Fixed and movable checkpoints were added along this main road and new
security cameras were added in the main entrances. The security based approach has also
forced the government to allow foreign consultants to inspect the domestic airports and
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has complied with their recommendations to demonstrate their commitment to the highest
standards of security.
A major contributor to the extreme loss of tourism, the security of the airport was
paramount. The most devastating action from foreign governments was the
implementation of travel bans on Egypt and the suspension of flights into the Sharm el
Sheikh airport. The government of Egypt has sought to remove these travel bans and has
attempted to adequately secure both the Sharm el Sheikh airport and the parameter of the
city itself. Russia suspended all direct flights to Egypt following the terrorist attack. It
wasn’t until the end of February 2018 that the Russian government permitted some direct
flights to resume into the Cairo airport.320 Egypt cooperated with Russian investigators
following the tragedy, and worked in tandem with foreign security experts to overhaul
security within the Sharm el Sheikh airport. This cooperation was necessary, as Russian
officials vowed to keep the travel ban until their security experts cleared the security
procedures at Egyptian airports.321 The UK government responded very quickly in the
days following the attack, where they rushed to return all British holidaymakers from
Sharm el Sheikh. The UK government swiftly imposed a travel ban to Egypt and
suspended flights into the Sharm el Sheikh airport, followed by the German, Italian and
Dutch governments taking the same measures.322 While the UK lifted the general travel
ban to Egypt, a ban remains in place against all but essential air travel to Sharm El
Sheikh.
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The demand for the new tourism space in the South Sinai has decreased with the
political instability and violence occurring within Egypt. Demand is externally created
and influenced, especially in the case of Sharm El Sheikh. Demand for sun/sand based
destinations changes, as these locations are homogenous and highly substitutable. As
previously discussed, the space was envisioned to cater to the mass tourism market
emerging from the European middle class. While originally positioned competitively
against other sand/sun locations in price point and physical location, the advent of
violence and the complications of travel bans have lessened the demand for Sharm El
Sheikh and encourages vacationers to choose other resorts. The South Sinai has lost its
former attractive low price point for travelers, and suffers from a highly negative image
of being unsafe for travel. With the travel bans in place, the price of flying to Sharm El
Sheikh rises due to the need to layover in Cairo or another city before continuing to the
destination. The low price of Sharm El Sheikh was heavily reliant on the ability for mass
beach tourists to use direct flights. The inability for these tourists to fly directly into
Sharm El Sheikh has negatively impacted the ability for Sharm El Sheikh to compete
against other similar destinations, and the resumption of flights into the city is controlled
by the decision making of origin countries. Demand for the tourism relies on more than
the price points of the destination, especially in locations which are perceived to be high
risk for the tourist. The perception of risk negatively impacts the decision making of
potential tourists.323 The political environment within Egypt can be considered a high risk
political atmosphere for tourism within the parameters of this study due to political
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repression, cyclical violence in the Sinai and violent political change within the last seven
years. The higher price of travel for the mass beach tourist, the highly substitutable resort
enclave model, and the perception of insecurity all contribute to tourists deciding against
vacations in Sharm el Sheikh.

4.5 Insecurity and the Compromised Tourism Space
Ironically, the new tourism space in the South Sinai offered the Mubarak
government a chance to foster growth in the tourism sector away from the fluctuations
faced by the industry during the height of terrorist activity in the 1990s. While the
government rapidly built the space and marketed it to the beach tourists coming from
Europe, the growing terrorism in the North Sinai saw the opportunity to affect political
change through the targeting the growing success of resorts in the South Sinai. With the
breakdown of the Mubarak regime and the sparking of insurgency in the North, the
tourism space in the South was increasingly vulnerable to political violence.
As Egypt experienced political instability over the last seven years, the tourism
industry reacted negatively with each major upheaval. The revolution itself decreased
tourism significantly, effectively costing the state over a billion dollars in tourism
revenues with a sustained loss of 5 million tourists in 2011 alone.324 The downward trend
in yearly national tourism indicators since the revolution is striking, with each year
falling and substantial losses during 2013 and 2016 coinciding with the coup d’état and
the Metrojet bombing at the end of 2015. The mainland political instability created a
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security vacuum and an opportunity for armed resistance in the North Sinai.325 While
tourism indicators in the South Sinai showed sustained revenues and tourist arrivals
despite the downward national trend before the end of 2015, the growing insecurity in the
peninsula allowed for the growth of terrorist capabilities and the eventual turning of the
focus of these organizations, once again, to the resorts in the South Sinai.
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CONCLUSION: THE VULNERABILITIES OF INSTABILITY, EXCLUSION
AND STUNTED TOURISM DEVELOPMENT

The tourism space of Sharm El Sheikh exemplifies the resort enclave developed
for the mass tourism market. This development has contributed to the vulnerability of the
tourism space to decline, which has been complicated by the devolving security threat on
the peninsula. In the effort to explore the government policy and external forces driving
development of this enclave, this project has examined the historical development, the
socio-economic dynamics of the created resort, and the security threats posed to the
space. The four research questions posed by this study have attempted to operationalize
the variables of government choice and limitations in power. The multiple vulnerabilities
to decline in the tourism space, the economic, social and security dynamics of the created
space have been examined. The first section analyzes the state’s motivations in designing
Sharm El Sheikh and encouraging its growth, along with the inherent vulnerability in
targeting mass beach tourism through the design of the resort. The relationship of the
local population and the tourism space was discussed through the second portion of this
study, and the third section broadly outlines the significant challenge of security to the
tourism enclave.
Dependency theorists heavily critique tourism in the global south due to the
inherent lack of power associated with a variety of structural, economic and social
conditions which influence the creation and maintenance of tourism spaces. The classic
dependent relationship outlined by many case studies focus on mass beach tourism and
the necessity for homogenous resort enclaves in the pleasure periphery. External forces
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exploit these spaces through profit leakages, foreign management and ownership of
tourism facilities, externally controlled packages for travel, control over demand for the
tourism space, and the dictation of a homogenous product of the resort enclave. Sharm el
Sheikh presents a unique case, which does not completely align with the dependency
modeled by other tourism enclaves.
The point of departure in the Sharm el Sheikh model of the tourism enclave is
where our research questions focus. The state’s choices in the development of this resort
holds an irony: the regime sought to resist external influences through the attempted
creation of a stable form of revenue, but traded formal control for the informal influence
of the power of externally controlled consumer demand. The resort enclave was born
from a need to stabilize the tourism sector away from Mainland Egypt when faced by the
highly destabilizing force of terrorism in the 1990s. This need for stable tourism was due
to the sectors capability of giving the state foreign reserves and extra funding for state
budgets. Socially, tourism represented a means of employment, when structural
adjustments threatened to erode the tenuous financial security of the population. The
regime faced a tough decision imposed by external debts: mandated structural
adjustments endangered the regime due to the potential hardships faced by the
population. The development of the resort enclaves during the late 1990s allowed for a
means to dictate the scheduling of structural adjustments according to the timetable
decided by the regime, while creating new and stable employment opportunities. This
new tourism for the state aided in resisting powerful outside influence, although the
influence over the economic stability of the tourism sector shifted after the rapid
development of the enclave.
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The resort was intentionally designed to capture the market of the European mass
tourist. The rapid development of Sharm El Sheikh was encouraged through government
policy due to the need to diversify the tourism sector away from instability created by
terrorism. This model places the power in the hands of the mass tourism market, as
demand is created and controlled externally. Package tours created in tourist’s home
countries encourage a race to the bottom within the resort: in the effort to capture
consumers, hotels and facilities must compete for business through attractive price points.
These packaged tours dictate where tourists visit and are able to maintain a majority of
the profits from tourism. Mass tourism degrades the destination according to the model of
the Tourism Area Life Cycle. The standardization and over use of the resort results in a
damaged environment, declining image of the destination, surplus of tourism facilities,
and a heavy reliance on repeat visitation. The exploitation of the resort through mass
tourism essentially destroys the demand for the tourism space. The mass tourism business
eventually leaves the destination without a significant reorientation of tourism strategy.
The deliberate design of Sharm el Sheikh for mass beach tourism, while once a resistance
to outside control, has created an informal dependency on external perception and
demand, while the space has diminished ability to compete against other standardized
beach locations.
External control over tourism to the resort also manifests politically. In the case of
political instability or violence, the image of the space is threatened through the
narratives circulated through the international media. Negative image of the destination
necessarily decreases demand for the space, as potential tourists engage in destination
substitution in favor of safer locations. Security risks for tourists are evaluated by foreign
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governments who sometimes choose to formally warn citizens against travel. This
subjective assessment of security risk is heavily dependent on relations between the
origin and destination, and in the case of the global south, is a relationship marked by
inequality. Destinations have little power to change the security warnings issued by
foreign governments. The perception concerning security represents an additional area
where the global south destination is subject to the power of origin countries. For Sharm
el Sheikh, the foreign issued travel warnings and the halting of direct flights to the resort
effectively crippled the city’s tourism for over a year and a half, with Egypt having
virtually no control over changing the narrative created through these actions. After the
development of the resort, the control initially exerted by the state eroded through the
inability to dictate demand or pricing for the resort.
The resort enclave of Sharm El Sheikh, built by the state, is wholly inorganic.
Mainland Egypt’s modernizing project of tourism development in the South Sinai
excluded the local population, breeding resentment towards the state. The Bedouin
dispossession of land dismantled their economic livelihoods and relegated the population
to the outskirts of these enclaves. The influx of Egyptian workers into these resorts
ensured further economic exclusion through the denial of available employment through
the tourism sector for the local population. Negative perceptions of the Bedouin have also
encouraged local government authorities to regulate the interactions between tourists and
Bedu, limiting their ability to gain informal income from tourism. This relationship has
replicated the power inequalities denounced by dependency theorists. The external force
has created the tourism space, without regard for the local economic and social context.
The enclave’s resources have been subject to the needs of the state, while the
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government, elites and Mainland Egyptian workers have substantially benefited from
opportunities created through the exploitation of this space. The local community has
suffered through destruction of their livelihoods and the lack of opportunity to gain
adequate income from tourism.
The devolving security in the Sinai threatens to prolong the difficult recovery of
the tourism industry. This factor is complicated by the main tourism to the area emerging
from the mass tourism market. The protracted conflict is cyclical in nature, with
retaliatory actions taking place between terrorist elements and state security forces. The
isolation of the territory and the alienation of the Bedouin population challenges the
ability for the state to secure the region, as it has little actual intelligence on the
conditions on the ground, and the population has little incentive to aid in security
operations. This complicated crisis severely impacts tourism as ongoing conflict
encourages mass tourism operators to choose alternate destinations. Heavy handed tactics
by security forces impact tourism demand alongside terrorist activity. The security
challenges posed by the convoluted situation in the Sinai will continue to threaten the
recovery of the tourism sector, especially in the case of the resort enclave of Sharm el
Sheikh.
Government decision making in tourism development, originally resistance
measures to external fiscal control, created several vulnerabilities to decline within this
industry in the case of Sharm el Sheikh. Designed as a resort enclave, marketed to the
mass beach tourist, and overly reliant on this form of tourism, Sharm el Sheikh was
vulnerable to decline according to the Tourism Area Life Cycle as modeled by the work
of Butler. The addition of social tensions created by economic and physical exclusion of
140

the local population created a contentious environment for this resort. The Metrojet
disaster and the larger conflict between terrorist elements and security forces have created
a volatile situation, which significantly degraded tourist arrivals to the resort and threaten
the ability of Sharm el Sheikh to fully recover.
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